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ARTICLES 
RATIONING EXPENSIVE LIFESAVING MEDICAL 
TREATMENTS 
MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN* 
In the last fifteen years, medical technology has made significant and 
spectacular advances. Hemodialysis, coronary artery bypass graft surgery, CT 
scanners, and organ transplants are among the treatments now available to patients. 
In recent months, in fact, the media has reported the increased use of artificial hearts, 
heart transplants, and liver transplants. These technological advances, however, have 
been accompanied by troublesome legal and ethical issues. For example, someone -· 
must decide which patients will receive a medical resource when demand exceeds 
supply. Similarly, and more commonly, someone must decide whether the significant 
- number of patients who cannot afford an available treatment should receive it despite 
the cost. In response to these troublesome issues, hospitals, doctors, and 
commentators have either proposed or implemented rationing systems based on 
criteria such as the social worth of the patient, likelihood of survival after the 
operation, and ability to pay. 
In this Article, Professor Mehlman examines the possible systems for rationing 
expensive lifesaving medical technologies. First, he concludes that the costs of any 
rationing system probably exceed its benefits. Consequently, he rejects the rationing 
of expensive but available lifesaving medical technologies. Second, he argues that the 
increased availability of the technologies and the recent expansion of patient rights to 
sue will result in a substantial number of judicial challenges to rationing. Finally, he 
suggests detailed criteria to aid the courts in deciding whether a resource has been 
improperly rationed. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Considerable attention has been focused recently on the enormous 
increases in health care costs in the United States. Health care expendi-
tures totalled about $287 billion in 1981, compared with $42 billion in 
1965. 1 By 1983, they had risen to $355 billion. 2 The share of the gross 
Assistant Professor of Law and Associate Director, The Law-Medicine Center, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law; B.A., Reed College, 1970; B.A., Oxford University, 
1972; J.D., Yale Law School, 1975. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the 
following in the preparation of this article: Bruce Auerbach, Sheila Bienenfeld, Ernest Gellhorn, 
Ira Greifer, M.D., Charles Plante, Tim Schally, Sally Verstreet, William Vodra. 
!. See PRESIDENT's COMMlSSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETIIICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, 1 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTil CARE: THE ETHICAL 1M-
PLICA TlONS OF DIFFERENCES lN TilE A VAJLABILITY OF HEAL Til SERVICES 184 (1983) [hereinafter cited 
as SECURING ACCESS TO HEAL Til CARE]. 
2. Crozier, Data Watch-National Medical Case Spending, 3 HEALTH AFF. 108 (1984). 
239 
240 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
national product devoted to health care increased from 6% in 1965 to 
10.8% in 1981. 3 
Advances in medical technology are given much of the blame for 
the rising cost of health care. Twenty to 40% of the increase in hospital 
care costs between 1966 and 1976 has been attributed to technology 
costs. 4 A number of specific lifesaving treatments have been singled out 
as causes of this increase. The cost per patient for hemodialysis is now 
approximately $30,000 a year, and more than 50,000 patients received 
the treatments in 1981. 5 Coronary artery bypass graft surgery costs ap-
proximately $10,000-20,000 per operation, and accounts for $2 billion a 
year or 1% of the total annual U.S. health care budget. 6 Intensive care 
units 7 and CT scanners8 are additional examples of expensive medical 
technology. 
3. SECURING AcCESS TO HEAL TI-l CARE, supra note 1, at 184; Crozier, supra note 2, at 
108. The concern about rising health care costs is heightened by the fact that these increases in 
medical expenditures over the last 10 to 15 years have not produced a corresponding improvement 
in health status, alleast in terms of survival rates for patients with the most prevalent diseases. See 
Altman & Wallack, Is Medical Technology the Culprit Behind Rising Health Care Costs? The Case 
For and Against, in MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, THE CULPRIT BEHIND HEALTH CARE COSTS 24, 25 (S. 
Altman & R. Blendon eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY]. 
4. See SUN VALLEY FORUI.·I ON NATIONAL HEALTH, REPORT OF THE 1977 SYMPOSIUM ON 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: Is TECHNOLOGY THE CULPRIT IN RISING 
HEALTH CARE COSTS? (hereinafter cited as SUN VALLEY REPORT) in MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra 
note 3, at 296. This estimate is based on studies which do not factor in the savings resulting from 
averting the need for hospitalization as a result of technological advances, for example, savings 
from patients who can return to normal life, or at least to outpatient status. See Altman & 
Wallack, supra note 3, at 27, 35-36. 
5. See Evans, Blagg & Bryan, Implications/or Health Care Policy: A Social and Demo-
graphic Profile of Hemodialysis Patients in the United States, 245 J. A.M.A. 487, 490 ( 1981) [herein-
after cited as Evans]. 
6. See Randall, Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery, 12 HASTINGS CENT. REP., Feb. 1982, 
al 13, 14. According to Randall, this makes it "collectively ... the most costly operation per-
formed in this country." !d. 
7. For a description of rationing necessitated by shortages of intensive care unit facili-
ties, see Mulley, The Allocation of Resources for Medical Intensive Care, in 3 SECURING ACCESS TO 
HEALTH CARE, supra note l, at 300-0!. The shortage of intensive care unit (ICU) facilities is delib-
erate: hospitals generally provide sufficient facilities to accommodate only between 80% and 90% 
of potential patients. !d. at 300 ("Such a policy ... determines that 10-20% of potential ICU 
admissions either will be rejected or will displace a patient presumably thought to be benefitting in 
some way from his position in the ICU"). In one eight-month period, 23 patients were denied 
admission to the intensive care unit at George Washington University Hospital, primarily because 
of a shortage of nurses. !d. at 30 I. 
8. The term "CT scanners" stands for computerized tomography scanners, a diagnos-
tic device that makes a composite image of the interior of the body by x-raying the body from 
several positions and integrating the images by computer. See Willems, Banta, Lucas & Taylor, 
The Computed Tomography (CT) Scanner, in MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 3, at 116-17 
[hereinafter cited as Willems]. The CT scanner was first introduced at the Mayo Clinic in 1973. !d. 
at 117. While they are now regarded as an important lifesaving device, not all hospitals have them, 
largely as a result of cost. See, e.g., Blake v. District of Columbia, No. 2623-80 (D.C. Super. Ct., 
June 30, 1981) (jury verdict in malpractice action brought by surviving spouse of patient against 
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The proliferation of these expensive medical treatments despite 
mounting health care costs has led to the suggestion that society may be 
--unable to provide these treatments to all who might benefit. 9 Many be-
lieve that some system of rationing-that is, deciding that only some 
treatments will be provided and only to some people-is necessary. 
These issues are not entirely new: medicine always has grappled 
with the problem of scarce resources. The classic example is battlefield 
triage, or deciding which battle casualties to treat first when there are 
not enough corpsmen or field surgeons to attend to all the wounded at 
once. 10 The triage problem also emerges in the event of natural or man-
made catastrophies, where there may be many victims and limited med-
ical resources. 
The availability of some medical treatments has been restricted be-
cause of technical supply problems. During World War II, for example, 
insufficient amounts of penicillin were produced because there was no 
procedure to synthesize the drug. 11 A similar supply problem arises 
from the lack of suitable donor organs for organ transplants. Donor 
organs must come from cadavers or, in the case of certain organs, from 
willing live donors, and usually must be matched to the recipient to 
reduce the risk of tissue rejection. 12 Accordingly, there may well be in-
public hospital for failing to transfer patient to hospital with CT scanner), discussed infra in notes 
225-31 and accompanying text. It has been estimated that, even in 1976, admittedly only a few 
years after they were first introduced, CT scanners yielded an annual profit to a hospital of between 
II% and 65% of the original purchase price of the equipment. See Willems, supra, at 132. 
9. See, e.g., H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONJNG Hos-
PITAL CARE (1984); EMPLOYEE BENEFIT REsEARCH INSTITUTE, RATIONING HIGH-COST HEALTH 
CARE: THE CASE OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS (Issue Brief #31, June I 984); Platt, Sounding Board: Cost 
Containment-Another View, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 726-30 (1983); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DISEASE BY DISEASE TOWARD NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE? (June 
1973) [hereinafter cited as INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE]; Blue Cross/Blue Shield to Curb X- Rays, Scans, 
Wash. Post, June 14, 1984, at AI6, col. 3; Rationing Care Called Dilemma for the '80s, Am. Med. 
News, Nov. 12, 1982, at 2. 
10. See G. WINSLOW, TRIAGE AND JUSTICE I-ll (1982); Childress, Triage in Neonatal 
Intensive Care: The Limitations of a Metaphor, 69 VA. L. REv. 547, 548-52 (1983). 
II. See W. HUGHES, ALEXANDER FLEMING AND PENICILLIN 59-79 (1974); J. SHEEHAN, 
THE ENCHANTED RING: THE UNTOLD STORY OF PENICILLIN 44-78 (1982). The difficulties of natu-
rally producing penicillin included the slow growth rate of the penicillin mold and impurities in the 
production batches. During the war, penicillin supplies were allocated in order to maximize the 
number of soldiers for combat. Accordingly, the drug was given to soldiers with venereal disease 
rather than to combat casualties since the former could re-enter battle immediately, while the latter 
could not rejoin their units until they recovered from their wounds. See Childress, supra note I 0, at 
551-52; Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 664 n.241 (1969). 
12. The risk that an organ recipient's body will reject the transplant can be significantly 
reduced by the drug cyclosporine, which was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion in November, 1983. In the case of liver transplants, for example, use of cyclosporine has 
increased one-year survival rates from 30% to 65-70%. See Iglehart, Transplalllation: The Prob-
lem of Limited Resources, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 123, 125 (1983). Congress is debating whether or 
not to authorize Medicare to reimburse health care providers for the cost of providing immu-
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sufficient organs available for those in need. 13 
Another set of conditions that sometimes limits the availability of 
medical treatments is the transition of a treatment from experimental to 
accepted status. After it is invented, a new therapeutic or diagnostic 
tool or technique is refined, and its advantages and drawbacks are com-
municated to and evaluated by the medical community. 14 During this 
period, the availability of the resource is often sharply restricted, in part 
by law. Experimental new drugs and medical devices, for example, are 
not widely available until they are approved for safety and effectiveness 
by the Food and Drug Administration, a process which usually takes 
years. 15 Furthermore, federal health care reimbursement programs and 
private insurance plans do not reimburse health care providers for ex-
perimental treatments, and this generally curtails their availability. 16 
nosuppressant drugs such as cyclosporine. See H.R. REP. No. 575 (Pt. 1), 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 
(1983); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, POTENTIAL COSTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANT OPTIONS 
(1983), reprinred in Hearings on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, 
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 82-84 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 
CBO TRANSPLANT REPORT]. Medicare currently only pays for the cost of drugs administered to 
hospitalized patients, while transplant patients must continue to take immunosuppressant drugs 
after they leave the hospital, and indeed for the rest of their lives. See Sandoz Sandimmune 
(Cyclosporine): Questions of Long Term Use, 46 FooD, DRUG, CosM. REP. T&G-1 ("The Pink 
Sheet") (1984) (quoting Edward N. Brandt, Jr., M.D., Assistant Secretary for Health, Department 
of Health and Human Services). Cost estimates for cyclosporine use for the year after transplanta-
tion alone range from $5,000 to $8,000 per patient. See CBO TRANSPLANT REPORT, supra, at 82. 
13. See generally R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL 325-33 (2d ed. !978) 
(scarcity of bone marrow transplants for leukemia victims). While approximately 5,000 kidney 
and !00 heart transplants were performed in 1982, as many as 20,000 persons presently need one 
or the other transplant to survive. See Panel Cites Need for !vfore Organ Donations, Wash. Post, 
June !0, !983, at A I, col. 4. The need for donor organs presents special ethical and legal problems. 
For example, transplanting cadaver organs requires a difficult determination of when the donor is 
deemed dead for purposes of removing the organ. See e.g., Note, Compulsory Removal of Cadaver 
Organs, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 693 (1969). Transplanting organs or tissue from live donors raises the 
questions of whether the donor has consented to the procedure and the extent to which potential 
donors can be pressured or coerced into consenting. See, e.g., Head v. Colloton, 33! N. W.2d 870 
(Iowa 1983) (leukemia victim has no right to have hospital reveal the identity of unwilling bone 
marrow transplant donor to the court or the victim's attorney for purposes of pressuring 
donation). 
14. The shortage of hemodialysis machines to treat victims of end-stage renal disease 
during the 1960's has been attributed in part to physicians' reluctance to acknowledge the thera-
peutic value of the treatment. See Rettig, The Policy Debate on Patient Care Financing for Victims 
of End-Stage Rena! Disease, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. !96, 204-08 (1976). 
15. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PATENT TERM EXTENSION AND THE PHAR-
MACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 13 (1982). Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 2! U.S.C. 
§§ 301-902 (1982), manufacturers are required to establish the safety and effectiveness of drugs 
and medical devices before they may be shipped in interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. § 505 
(drugs);§§ 501([}, 5!5 (medical devices). 
16. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(l)(A) (1982) (Medicare prohibits reimbursement for 
items or services "which are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness 
or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member"). The Office of Technology 
Assessment in the Department of Health and Human Services issues periodic requests for com-
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Experimental scarcity is illustrated by the case of heart trans-
plants-both human and artificial. 17 Although human heart trans-
plants have been performed for over seventeen years, 18 they are still 
widely regarded as experimental and are relatively rare. 19 For example, 
the trustees of Massachusetts General Hospital decided not to initiate a 
heart transplant program in 1980 partially due to the procedure's ex-
perimental nature and especially due to tissue rejection problems. 20 Ar-
tificial heart transplants similarly are experimental; headlines were 
made in 1983 when one man lived for 112 days with an implanted artifi-
cial heart. 21 
ments on various medical procedures to determine if they are experimental or have become suffi-
ciently well-established that they should be regarded as "reasonable and necessary" under Medi-
care. See. e.g., Request for Information on Hyperthermic Chemotherapeutic Limb Perfusion in 
Treatment of Melanoma of the Extremities, 48 Fed. Reg. 16,754 (1983); Request for Additional 
Information on Role of Intra-Operative Ventricular and Atrial Mapping in Treatment of Tachy-
arrhythmias, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,201 (1983). 
17. Human heart transplants also involve technological scarcity because of the lack of 
suitable donors. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
18. The first human heart transplant was performed by Dr. Christian Barnard in Decem-
ber, 1967. See Heart: Miracle in Cape Town, 70 NEWSWEEK 86-90 (1967). 
19. On November 3, 1979, the Health Care Finance Administration, Department of 
Health and Human Services (HCF A), authorized human heart transplants on an interim basis at 
only one center in the United States, Stanford Medical Center. As a result, only transplants per-
formed at Stanford were considered "reasonable and necessary" such that their costs would be 
reimbursed-under Medicare. See 45 Fed. Reg. 52,296 (1980). According to HCFA, Stanford was 
the only center that had produced sufficient information on methods and success rates to allow an 
assessment of safety and effectiveness. !d. But only nine months later, HCF A tem1inated authori-
zation for reimbursement of heart transplants at Stanford because of insufficient information to 
establish general coverage criteria. HCF A stated that it was unable to answer questions concern-
ing patient selection, the basis for assessing safety and effectiveness at centers other than Stanford, 
long-term social and economic consequences, broad ethical considerations, cost effectiveness, and 
the potential for broad expansion in the availability of the procedure. 45 Fed. Reg. 52,296, 52,297 
(1980). HCFA did not explain why it revoked the authority to perform transplants at Stanford in 
light of its earlier conclusion that there was sufficient data to assess the safety and effectiveness of 
the procedure at that center. In addition, it is also noteworthy that the Department of Health and 
Human Services estimated that approximately 50% of the recipients of heart transplants at Stan-
ford experienced extended survival. HHS News Release, June 12, 1980, reprinted in [1980 Transfer 
Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 30,532. 
20. See Leaf, The MGH Trustees Say No to Heart Transplants, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 
1087 (1980). 
21. See DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCA T!ON AND WELFARE, THE TOTALLY IMPLANTABLE ARTI-
FICIAL HEART; ECONOMIC, LEGAL, MEDICAL, PSYCHIATRIC, SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS (1973) (hereinaf-
ter cited as THE TOTALLY IMPLANTABLE ARTIFICIAL HEART); De Vries, Anderson, Joyce, Anderson, 
Hammond, Jarvik & Kolff. Clinical Use oft he Total Artificial Heart, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 273-78 
( 1984); Barney Clark Dies on 112th Day with Permanent Artificial Heart, N.Y. Times, March 24, 
1983, at AL col. 2. In 1976, the Department of Health and Human Services estimated that there 
eventually could be ten times as many artificial heart recipients as kidney machine patients, of 
which there are currently approximately 50,000 in the United States. See DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDu-
CATION AND WELFARE, THE PLACE OF BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE AND MEDICINE AND THE STATE OF SCI-
ENCE, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S BIOMEDICAL REsEARCH PANEL App. A (1976), cited in G. WINS-
LOW, supra note 10, at 28 n.l6; Evans, supra note 5, at 490. 
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Allocating medical treatments that are in short supply due to bat-
tlefield conditions, technical limitations on production and experimen-
tal constraints are difficult and ethically troublesome. 22 Generally, 
however, the options are circumscribed by the available medical re-
sources. 23 The only question is who should receive them. Economists 
!? In the case of experimental scarcity, for example, the issue often is not who gets the 
benefit from being given the scarce resource, but who takes the risk. Potentially harmful experi-
mental resources, or those without established therapeutic benefit, may be tested on human guinea 
pigs who are likely to be the less educated and poorer members of society. See J. KATZ & A. 
CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT? 28 (!975). The problem with allocating 
experimentally scarce resources is assessing the risk versus the benefit to the patient, whereas with 
economic scarcity, the issue is assessing the cost versus the benefit to the patient. The former is 
illustrated by the example of artificial heart transplants, where the surgeon who pioneered the 
procedure in the United States, Dr. Denton Cooley, was sued for malpractice by the family of the 
recipient of the first artificial heart when he died only a few hours after surgery. See Karp v. 
Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (I 974). One of the claims against Dr. 
Cooley was that he had unlawfully experimented on his patient. The Fifth Circuit upheld a di-
rected verdict for the surgeon on the grounds that the patient had given informed consent to the 
operation and that there was no evidence that the procedure was "other than therapeutic." Karp, 
493 F.2d at 423. For a discussion of the ethical issues involved in implanting the first total artificial 
heart, see Woolley, Ethical Issues in the Implantation of the Total Artificial Heart, 310 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 292-96 (1984). 
23. What might first appear to be technological or experimental scarcity sometimes is 
caused by economic scarcity. For example, blood shortages, see G. WINSLOW, supra note 10, at 20-
21, probably would be alleviated if a greater sum were paid for donations. Even donor organs 
might be considered economically rather than technologically scarce; while only so many are avail-
able at any particular time, consider the potential increase in the number available if a substantial 
reward were offered for donations. One physician recently was planning to set up a referral service 
for buying and selling transplant organs. See Va. Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human 
Kidneys, Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1983, at A9, col. 5. His proposal was criticized widely. On October 
5, 1983, Rep. Albert Gore (D. Tenn.) introduced a bill entitled the National Organ Transplant Act 
which, among other things, would make the sale of human organs a felony punishable by a fine of 
up to $50,000 and imprisonment for up to five years. 129 Cong. Rec. H 8,076 (Oct. 5, 1983) (re-
marks of Rep. Gore). Sen. Tsongas (D. Mass.) similarly introduced a resolution condemning sales 
of human organs for profit. 129 Cong. Rec. S 14,698 (Oct. 26, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Tsongas). 
Situations of experimental scarcity often are exacerbated by treatment costs; a new tech-
nique may not become therapeutically accepted until it is widely available, and it may not be 
widely available because of its cost. See J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, supra note 22, at 168 ("Acceptance 
has often been equated in the literature with availability and thus the label 'experimental' has been 
attached to those procedures which are not yet available, although the Jack of availability may 
reflect not only hesitation or ignorance on the part of most physicians about the value of the 
procedure but also the inability of the health care system to provide the procedure to all who are 
'suitable' for it"). 
Furthermore, a resource may be labeled "experimental" to avoid the difficult allocation 
problems that arise if it has proven therapeutic benefit. At least one member of a group responsible 
for allocating hemodialysis machines during the 1960's rationalized his actions on this basis. See J. 
KATZ & A. CAPRON, supra note 22, at 168. See also Federal Liver-Transplant Policy Said to Cause 
Children's Deaths, Wash. Post, April 28, 1983, at A22, col. I (criticizing federal policies catego-
rizing heart and liver transplants as "experimental," thereby precluding federal reimbursement 
and depriving needy patients of life-saving treatments). 
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call this a "microallocation" problem. 24 
The current debate on rationing focuses on a different type of con-
straint-cost. Unlike the shortage of penicillin during World War II, 
there presumably is no technological limit on the supply of the resource; 
nor is the availability of the treatment necessarily restricted because of 
uncertain therapeutic benefits. Instead, treatment limitations are pro-
posed to save money. 
Under both cost-based rationing and technical or experimental 
scarcity, microallocation decisions are needed to determine who re-
ceives treatment. However, cost-based rationing entails additional deci-
sions on whether, and to what extent, to restrict the availability of treat-
ment on grounds of cost. These are termed "macroallocation" 
decisions. 2 5 They are based partially on a comparison of the cost of the 
treatment with the cost of other desirable medical and nonmedical re-
sources. For example, medical resources which might be devoted to 
purchasing a new therapeutic or diagnostic device such as a dialyzer26 
or CT scanner27 might instead be spent on hiring more hospital staff, 
providing additional intensive care units, or promoting preventive, 
early detection or rehabilitation programs. 28 But should macroalloca-
tion decisions not also turn on the cost of treatment versus the cost of 
denying treatment? As this Article will show, formidible transaction 
costs are incurred in achieving certain microallocation outcomes. If 
these and other rationing costs exceed treatment costs, is rationing a 
rational method for controlling health care expenditures? 
This question is avoided by those favoring rationing. They begin 
by assuming that sufficient medical resources cannot be provided, and 
that rationing therefore is unavoidable. 29 But this is not the case. As-
suming there is no technological or experimental barrier to providing 
additional medical resources, availability is a function of cost. Increas-
ing the supply of these resources to avoid the need for rationing would 
require restrictions on the supply of other resources and might be ex-
tremely expensive, but whether it would be too expensive can only be 
determined if the costs of rationing are carefully assessed. 
Surprisingly, the advocates of rationing acknowledge that microal-
location decisions might be costly, and that society therefore might de-
24. See Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Decisions Affecting 
Human Life and Health, 40 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn, 1976, at 231, 250, 254. 
25. !d. 
26. See infra 35-42 and accompanying text. 
27. See supra note 8. 
28. See SUN VALLEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 293-94. 
29. See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 24, at 252; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 9, at 
7-8; Note, Patient Selection for Artificial and Transplanted Organs, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1322, 1328-29 
(1969). 
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cide to provide more resources to avoid making them. But instead of 
properly regarding this as a macroallocation question, they view it as a 
form of blackmail30 and argue that it should be prevented by ignoring 
microallocation difficulties in making macroallocation decisions. 31 This 
leaves open the possibility that rationing will produce a net social loss. 
The possibility of net social loss from rationing, however, does not 
mean that all medical treatments must be provided on an unlimited ba-
sis. Some may be wasteful, 32 and some may be rationed with few social 
costs. 33 But some medical resources may be so costly to ration that they 
should not be targets of economizing. 
Improper candidates for rationing perhaps can be identified by ex-
amining past cases of cost-based rationing. One example is the shortage 
in the 1930's of expensive artificial respirators, or "iron lungs," for 
treating polio. The need for rationing initially was overcome by volun-
tary contributions through the March of Dimes, and the problem even-
tually was solved by development of the preventive polio vaccine in the 
1950's. 34 
A more notorious example of cost-based rationing is the distribu-
tion of hemodialysis machines used to treat the victims of fatal end-
stage renal disease in the 1960's and early 1970's. 3 5 Early efforts to dia-
lyze patients successfully were hampered by the need repeatedly to 
30. See Blumstein, supra note 24, at 252. 
31. ld. at 254. Blumstein states: 
In situations ... where a hearing would determine the relative merits of competing 
claimants for scarce medical resources, hearing officers and decisionmakers should have 
their authority clearly confined to the microa!location choice. [One reason for this] is the 
risk that if macro reallocation is an option, then the incentives to consider resource limi-
tations would disappear. A!locative constraints, necessitated by macroallocation deci-
sions, can only be respected if the adjudicatory bodies have their authority limited to 
choosing beneficiaries for utilization of scarce medical resources. Otherwise, the identifi-
able lives involved in the hearing could all too easily implicate modifications in the macro 
decision, thereby avoiding the hard choices necessitated by resource scarcity (footnotes 
omitted). 
Accord Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovbjerg, Strategies In Underwriting the Costs of Catastrophic 
Diseases, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn, 1976, at 122, 142-45 [hereinafter cited as Havig-
hurst]. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 9 (objecting to the Social Security Amend-
ments of 1972, see infra note 42 and accompanying text, which made hemodialysis treatments 
reimbursable under Medicare for persons under the age of 65). 
32. See, e.g., Komaroff, The Doctor, the Hospital and the Definition of Proper Medical 
Practice in 3 SECURING AccESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note I, at 225-51 (discussing unnecessary 
diagnostic testing and other wasteful practices). 
33. Candidates might be certain types of elective surgery, such as facelifts. 
34. See Rationing Care Called Dilemma for the '80s, supra note 9, at 62. 
35. Hemodialysis is the process of filtering impurities from the bloodstream. This nor-
mally is accomplished by the kidneys. Persons with end-stage renal disease can no longer ade-
quately filter out impurities from their blood. Toxic substances build up in their bloodstreams (a 
condition called uremia), eventually causing death. If the blood of end-stage renal disease victims 
is artificially cleansed or "dialyzed" several times a week, however, their deaths can be averted. See 
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puncture the patients' arteries and veins to allow their blood to be 
drawn and filtered. 36 In I 960, however, Dr. Belding Scribner invented a 
short tube or cannulae, one end of which remained permanently at-
tached to an artery and the other to a nearby vein; the cannulae had a 
valve or "shunt" which could be hooked up to tubes from a dialyzer 
machine, thus avoiding the need to repuncture the patient to draw 
blood. This created an unprecedented demand for the machines, which 
cost several thousand dollars each, in addition to the costs for the per-
sonnel and space needed to operate them. 37 Hospitals had few, if any, 
machines, and could provide them only to a limited number of pa-
tients. 38 Various rationing systems were used, 39 and thousands of pa-
tients died as a direct result of being unable to secure the costly 
treatments. 40 
Eventually, the press dramatized the plight of the victims of the 
disease, and the patients mounted a vigorous lobbying campaign.41 
These efforts emphasized the costs of denying treatment, and led to pas-
sage of the Social Security Amendments of 1972 which alleviated the 
Delmez, Pathophysiological Principles in Treatment of Patients with Renal Failure, in THE KIDNEY 
AND BODY FLUIDS IN HEALTH AND DISEASE 492-93 (S. Klahr ed. 1983). 
36. See 1. KATZ & A. CAPRON, supra note 22, at 36-37. 
37. See generally G. WINSLOW, supra note 10, at 12-13; Rettig, supra note 14, at 201-02. 
38. At least one additional reason for the shortage of hemodialysis machines was the 
opinion of many members of the medical community that the procedure was experimental rather 
than therapeutic. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text; telephone interview with Ira 
Greifer, M.D. (June 28, 1983). For a description of the effect of medical opinion on the transition 
of hemodialysis from experimental to therapeutic status in the medical community, see Rettig, 
supra note 14, at 204-08. 
39. See infra notes 89-94, 113, 115-118, 125, 197, and accompanying text. 
40. There are no reliable mortality estimates, at least partially because the deaths from 
end-stage renal disease during this period often were attributed to heart failure or other complica-
tions, rather than to uremia. Telephone interview with Ira Greifer, M.D., supra note 38. However, 
one account suggests that as many as 5,500 people died in 1970 alone because of the unavailability 
of hemodialysis treatments. See For LJ's Kidney Patients-Survival is an Ordeal, Newsday, Nov. I, 
1971, reprinted in Hearings on National Health Insurance Proposals Before the House Commi/lee on 
Ways and Means, 92d Con g., 1st Sess. 1542-45 (1971) (Statement of Mrs. Shep Glazer) [hereinafter 
cited as Hearings on National Health Insurance]. 
A much higher estimate can be derived from Evans' data comparing the demographics of 
the population on dialysis in 1974, just after the end of the rationing crisis, and in 1980. See Evans, 
supra note 5, at 488, 490. In 1974, approximately 700 blacks were on dialysis, compared with 
17,500 in 1980. Since it is unlikely that end-stage renal disease suddenly struck large numbers of 
blacks after 1974, it can be inferred that several thousand blacks per year died from lack of treat-
ment before 1974. Similarly, in 1980, over 22,000 women received dialysis compared with only 
2,500 in 1974. Again, this suggests that thousands of women per year died from rationing prior to 
1974. 
41. See Alexander, They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies, 53 LIFE, Nov. 9, 1962, at 102-04; 
Hearings on National Health Insurance, supra note 40; see generally Rettig, supra note 14. 
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shortage of dialysis by reimbursing most patients for treatments under 
Medicare. 42 
The dialysis experience may pinpoint one type of medical resource 
that should not be rationed to cut costs: lifesaving resources for those 
patients who desire them. 43 Therefore, it especially is striking that the 
proponents of rationing focus on lifesaving resources as a primary tar-
get for rationing, believing their high cost to be a major contributor to 
the rising cost of health care. 44 
This Article examines the issues involved in rationing expensive 
lifesaving medical treatments (ELTs). 45 The discussion will begin by 
examining the costs associated with rationing ELTs and the reasons for 
those costs. I will argue that these costs are likely to be so great that 
rationing EL Ts is an inefficient method of controlling health care costs. 
The Article then will explore the potential responses of the legal system 
to lawsuits filed by patients denied lifesaving treatment on cost 
42. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, § 2991, 42 U.S.C. § 426(e)(3) (1976) (cur-
rent version at 42 U.S.C. § 426-1 (1982)). Medicare was established in 1965 and originally covered 
victims of end-stage renal disease over 65 years old. The Social Security Amendments of 1972 
extended coverage to victims of end-stage renal disease under age 65 in two ways. First, they 
extended Medicare hospital and supplemental medical insurance protection to kidney patients 
under 65 who were entitled to receive cash disability benefits under social security or railroad 
retirement plans. Second, the amendments characterized as disabled-and therefore entitled to 
Medicare coverage-all other patients under 65 who were covered by social security, or their 
spouses and dependants. See Rettig, supra note 14, at 198-99. 
43. The legality of withholding treatment from patients who wish to die, or euthanasia, 
is vexatious. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), ajf'd, 379 So.2d 359 
(Fla. 1980); Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F .2d 1000 (D.C. 
Cir. 1964). The problem is exacerbated when the patient is incompetent and his family or physi-
cians seek to establish what the patient's wishes would be if he were competent. See Barber v. 
Superior Court of the State of California, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rplr. 484 (2d Dist. 
1983), discussed infra at note 246 and accompanying text; Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 
Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); In re Severns, 425 A.2d !56 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re Spring, 380 
Mass. 629,405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); 
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 
N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431,426 N.Y.S.2d 517 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980); In re Fox, 73 A.D.2d 431,426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); In re 
Mora, 107 Misc. 2d 290,433 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 
68 Ohio Misc. l, 22 Ohio Op. 3d 48, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). A number of states, notably California, have 
enacted statutory provisions permitting persons to direct that treatment be withheld, such as by 
executing in advance so-called "living wills." See, e.g., California Natural Death Act, CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985). For a general discussion of the question 
of withholding life-sustaining treatment, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE ANO BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, DECIDING TO fOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1983) (hereinafter cited as DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT). 
44. See supra note 31. 
45. Childress calls them "scarce lifesaving medical resources" or "SLMR's." Childress, 
Who Shall Live When Not AI/ Can Live?, in VALUING LIFE, PuBLIC POLICY DILEMMAS 203, 204 (S. 
Rhoads ed. 1980) (hereinafter cited as VALUING LIFE). 
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grounds. I will explain why the courts are unlikely to uphold any system 
of cost-based rationing and why certain types of legal challenges would 
be more successful than others. Finally, I will offer guidelines to aid the 
courts in deciding cases that may arise in this turbulent area. 
II. THE CosTs OF RATIONING ELTs 
Despite the popular conception that ELTs are a major contributor 
to the rising costs of health care, there is scant data on the subject. The 
cost of only certain federal lifesaving programs, such as the End-Stage 
Renal Disease Program under Medicare, is known.46 There are no 
available estimates of the total amount being spent on ELTs, of the 
impact of increases in available ELTs, or ofthe impact ofELT costs on 
health care costs generally. 4 7 In fact, there is considerable debate over 
-- whether ELTs are a significant factor in rising health care costs. 48 Fur-
thermore, no studies have assessed the economic benefits as well as the 
costs of ELTs. These benefits include, for example, direct savings in 
health care and related costs49 and indirect savings in the form of con-
tributions from those who live and become economically productive. 50 
Even assuming that ELTs are a major factor in the increased cost 
of health care, they may be cheaper than rationing. Although no less 
difficult to quantify than the costs of treatment, the costs of rationing 
ELTs probably are extremely high. Tangible costs include the economic 
consequences of the deaths of those denied treatment, such as lost earn-
ings and the administrative expenses of a rationing program. Depend-
ing on the rationing method employed, the latter could be enormous; 
consider the administrative costs of an approach in which each patient 
is afforded an opportunity for a hearing, legal representation, and judi-
cial review. 51 
46. The total cost of the program was approximately $1.8 billion in fiscall982. See CBO 
TRANSPLANT REPORT, supra note 12, at 80-87. 
47. See. e.g., PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY ON CosT CONTROL, MANAGEMENT 
OFFICE SELECTED IssUES VoL. IX: FEDERAL HEALTH CARE COSTS 29 (1984). 
48. Compare Altman & Wallack, supra note 3, at 27, 35-36 ll'ith Moloney & Rogers, 
Medical Technology-A Differeni View of Ihe Conienlious Debaie Over Costs, 301 NEw ENG. J. 
MED. 1413, 1413-14 (1979) (The latter authors blame low-cost services such as laboratory tests 
rather than "big-ticket" lifesaving technology for increased health care costs). 
49. Such benefits might include the savings from averting the need for continued care of 
tem1inal patients. See, e.g., Altman & Wallack, supra note 3, at 27. However, it might be objected 
that an ELT merely postpones rather than avoids the cost of terminal care, because those who 
recover as a result of the ELT will eventually die anyway, perhaps of another disease requiring 
substantial terminal care. 
50. See Hodgson, The S1a1e of I he ArT of CosT-of-Illness Esiimaies, in 4 ADvANC' . IN 
HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH, 135 (R. ScheiDer ed. 1983). 
51. See infra notes 179-94 and accompanying text. 
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Rationing also would entail considerable intangible costs. First, 
there probably would be a serious, detrimental effect on the relationship 
between patients and those making rationing decisions. Physicians and 
hospital staff would be viewed as "gatekeepers" or executioners rather 
than as healers 52 with a consequent erosion of physician-patient 
trust. 53 The doctor's self-image would be affected, and both his training 
and the ethics of his profession would have to be modified to equip him 
to deal with his new roles. 54 Furthermore, tremendous pressure would 
be placed on macroallocation decision-makers-such as hospital au-
thorities, government officials and legislators-who would determine 
how many ELTs would be provided and generally who would get them. 
There would be bitter contests over how public and private funds would 
be allocated; imagine a choice between laying down new hospital car-
peting and providing a patient with an ELT. Finally, there would be 
severe effects on patients and their families and friends. Rejection 
would create outrage, desperation, and eventually, of course, death. Se-
lection could also produce serious psychological reactions. 5 5 These ef-
fects would result from any EL T rationing, including cases of techno-
logical 56 and experimental scarcity, 57 but they are likely to be much 
more exaggerated when cost is ostensibly the only obstacle to 
survival. 58 
52. See H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 104. 
53. Some commentators favor the use of random systems such as lotteries to determine 
who receives EL Ts on the assumption that they will maintain physician-patient trust. See, e.g., 
Willard, Scarce Medical Resources and the Right to Refuse Selection by Artificial Chance, 5 J. MED. 
& PHIL. 225, 225-26 (1980). It is difficult to see how rapport can be sustained when the patient's 
survival is treated as a matter of chance. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBIIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 134 
(I 978) ("The chance that lotteries give is a computer chance, not a human one"). 
54. See Mamana, Ethics and Technology: Crossroads in Decision Making, 35 TRUSTEE, 
Jan. 1982, at 33-38; Mulley, supra note 7, at 301-02; Schwartz & Aaron, Rationing Hospital Care: 
Lessons From Britain, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 52, 53 (1984) ("Explicit limitation of medical re-
sources puts physicians in a position that many of them find awkward. Neither the training nor the 
ethics of medicine prepare most physicians to make the required decisions in economic terms"). 
See also American Medical Association, Allocation of Health Resources, Op. 2.02, Current Opin-
ions of the Judicial <:;:ouncil2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as American Medical Association Opinions) 
("A physician has a duty to do all that he can for the benefit of his individual patients without 
assuming total responsibility for equitable disbursement of society's limited health resources. To 
expect a physician in the context of his medical practice to administer governmental priorities in 
the allocation of scarce health resources is to create a conflict with the physician's primary respon-
sibility to his patients that would be socially undesirable"). 
55. It has long been known that many people who survive disasters that claim lives suffer 
severe psychological reactions, known as "survivor syndrome." See G. STERN, THE BUFFALO 
CREEK DISASTER 101-03 (1976). 
56. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
57. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text. 
58. In contrast to experimental scarcity, no argument can be made that the denial of 
treatment on grounds of cost is for the patient's good. See supra note 22. Moreover, in contrast to 
true technological scarcity, a victim of cost-based rationing is denied treatment because his life is 
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Even though it is impossible to quantify rationing costs precisely, 
their magnitude can be estimated roughly by calculating the amount 
paid to avoid rationing. 59 The most notable publicprogram specifically 
created to avoid ELT rationing is Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease 
Program. This program, discussed earlier, 60 provides reimbursement 
under Medicare for life-sustaining hemodialysis treatments and kidney 
transplants for patients who would otherwise not qualify for Medicare 
benefits. It was adopted to prevent the deaths of patients who could not 
afford treatment, or who would have been denied treatment under vari-
ous rationing systems. 61 Currently, over 50,000 patients are kept alive 
by dialysis treatments paid for by Medicare. 62 This End-Stage Renal 
Disease Program provides hard data on the amount currently being 
spent to avoid rationing of ELTs for one disease: in fiscal year 1982, the 
pro gram costs were $1. 8 billion. 6 3 
not deemed to be worth the cost of saving it, rather than because there is no known way of provid-
ing enough of the treatment to go around. 
59. This method of estimating the costs of rationing resembles the "willingness-to-pay" 
method for estimating the costs of illnesses. Under a willingness-to-pay approach, the cost of an 
illness is calculated by determining the amount that an individual would be willing to pay to avoid 
the illness. See Hodgson, supra note 50, at 156-60. 
60. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra note 41. 
62. See Evans, supra note 5, at 490. 
63. CBO TRANSPLANT REPORT, supra note 12, at 80. As noted therein, this includes bene-
fits provided for transplants as well as for dialysis. 
It might be objected that this figure, which represents the total amount spent on the Medi-
care End-Stage Renal Disease Program, vastly overstates what society is willing to spend to avoid 
rationing. First, the program costs have been criticized as excessive. See e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDI-
CINE, supra note 9; Bovbjerg, Medicare's End Stage Renal Disease Program: How a More Competi-
tive Approach Would Address Important Policy Issues, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT (Aug. 
1983). These criticisms suggest that the program costs exceed the perceived costs of rationing ELTs 
for treatment of end-stage renal disease. Moreover, a substantial portion of the costs of the pro-
gram can be attributed to inflation and to program-momentum rather than to any real desire to 
avoid rationing. Finally, many of the patients whose end-stage renal disease treatments are paid 
for by Medicare probably would obtain treatment by other means if Medicare coverage were 
terminated, so that the total cost of the program more accurately reflects the price we are willing io 
pay to avoid providing treatment to none rather than the cost of providing treatment only to some. 
Accepting these objections, a more accurate measure of the perceived costs of rationing end-
stage renal disease ELTs might be the cost estimates that were made when Congress enacted the 
program. These estimates generally were around $75 million for the first year, and about $250 
million for the fourth year. See Rettig, supra note 14, at 224-26. (First year costs in fact were on the 
order of $150 million, with fourth year costs around $360 million. I d. at 201, Table II. The differ-
ences in projected and actual costs have led to criticisms that Congress was poorly informed when 
it enacted the program. Id. at 225-27.) However, these estimates are vulnerable to criticism as a 
measure of the rationing costs. For example, several key congressional proponents of the program 
believed that program costs would decline with advances in medical technology. Jd. at 224. The 
original perceptions of the cost of rationing treatments over the long run might therefore have 
been lower than the first and fourth year projections suggest. Nevertheless, Congress was willing to 
spend hundreds of millions of dollars to make ELTs available to treat a single disease, and the 
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Another indication of congressional unwillingness to ration ELTs 
is its recent mandate thatliver transplants be provided to dependents of 
active duty servicemen and military retirees. 64 This occurred following 
dramatic media coverage of the efforts of an Army captain to obtain a 
liver transplant for his 31-month old daughter, 65 though liver trans-
plants continue to be regarded by many as experimental rather than 
proven lifesaving procedures. 66 
Apart from federal programs aimed specifically at providing life-
saving resources to all in need, many government health care plans re-
duce the impact of high priced lifesaving medical care for the poor and 
the elderly. For example, Medicare reimburses health care providers for 
all reasonable and necessary items or services for eligible patients, gen-
erally the elderly. 67 Medicaid, through a combination of federal and 
state funding, provides health care to certain groups of the poor and the 
disabled. 68 Need-based medical care is one of the benefits enjoyed by 
servicemen69 and their dependents. 70 In addition, several states have 
enacted laws requiring health care facilities to provide emergency care 
impetus for Congress' action largely came from a desire to avoid the economic, political, social 
and personal costs of EL T rationing. 
64. Dept. of Defense Authorization Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-94, § 93(a), 97 Stat. 649 
( 1983). See CONFERENCE REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1984, S. REP. 
No. 213, 98th Cong., lst Sess. 229 (1983). 
65. Interview with Diane Lawrence, Staff Director, Office of Civilian Health and Medi-
cal Program of the Uniformed Services, Feb. 14, 1983. No policy has been established on whether 
to provide liver transplants to members of the armed services since the issue has not arisen, par-
tially because a person with serious liver disease would not be accepted into the service. Id. 
66. See Iglehart, Transplantation: The Problem of Limited Resources, 309 NEw ENG. J. 
MED. 123, 125 (1983). 
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(l)(A) (1982). The phrase "reasonable and necessary'" has 
been interpreted broadly to mean, in most cases, items and services that the attending physician 
certifies are required. See, e.g., Breeden v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 734, 737 (M.D. La. 1974); 
Reading v. Richardson, 339 F. Supp. 295 (E. D. Mo. 1972); SECURING AccESS TO HEALTH CARE, 
supra note I, at !50. In addition to the elderly, Medicare beneficiaries include victims of end-stage 
rena! disease and certain disabled persons under the age of 65. See 42 U.S.C. § 426(e)(3) (1982) 
(End-Stage Renal Disease Program); 42 U.S.C. § 426(b) (1982) (disabled individuals under age 65). 
68. Under federal law, states participating in Medicaid (all as of 1984) are required to 
extend coverage to the aged, blind, and disabled and to recipients of Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children. A number of states and the District of Columbia have expanded the number of 
those eligible for Medicaid to include other segments of the poor. See Connor, The Medicaid 
Program in Transition in 3 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note I, app. at 83. 
69. See 10 U.S.C. § 1074 (1982) (no limitations on health care provided io active duty 
servicemen). Military retirees are treated on an as-needed basis for service-related injuries and 
diseases, and on a space-available basis for other ailments. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 601-28 ( 1982). See also 
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS AND DEPENDENTS 5, 9 (1983). 
70. Dependents of active duty servicemen receive health care under the Civilian Health 
and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §§ 1076 
( 1982), while certain dependents of veterans are covered under the Civilian Health and Medical 
Program of the Veterans Administration (CHAMPVA), 38 U.S.C. § 613 ( 1982). 
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to patients regardless of their ability to pay. 71 Finally, there have been a 
number of other federal and state programs aimed at facilitating health 
care access for specific groups, such as the poor, the aged, and persons 
living in rural areas. 72 
Again, some measure of rationing costs can be obtained from the 
costs of these programs. The Medicare budget for fiscal year 1982, for 
example, was over $50 billion. 7 3 There are no breakdowns of how 
much of the budgets of these programs are attributable to expenditures 
for ELTs; these programs are neither explicitly nor primarily designed 
to avoid ELT rationing. 74 Nevertheless, at least a portion of the costs 
of these programs reflects the price paid to avoid rationing ELTs. 
The cost of ELT rationing is so high for two reasons. First, these 
resources save lives under the most compelling circumstances: where a 
specific individual's life is at stake. Second, there is no suitable system 
for deciding who should receive treatment. These factors are discussed 
more fully in the following sections. 
A. The Lifesaving Imperative 
EL Ts are a particular kind of lifesaving resource: they save specific 
individuals who are in immediate peril, such as Mrs. Smith who re-
quires a kidney dialysis to stay alive, or Johnny Jones who requires a 
particular drug. Therefore, the lives saved by EL Ts are called "identifi-
71. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 2805-b (McKinney 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. Ill 1/2, 
§ 86 (Smith-Hurd 1977). 
72. For a summary of these programs, see SECURING AccESs TO HEALTH CARE, supra 
note I, at 115-82. One such program was the so-called Hill-Burton program, which was in effect 
from 1946 untill974. Under Hill-Burton, federal funds were provided to states for construction of 
new hospital facilities in return, inter alia, for a commitment by the states to provide "a reasonable 
volume of hospital services to persons unable to pay therefore." Hospital Survey and Construction 
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946). 
73. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH-UNITED STATES 
AND PREVENTION PROFILE 198 (1983) [hereinafter referred to as HEALTH]. 
74. None of these programs expressly prohibit rationing. Thus, for example, the Medi-
care standard requiring reimbursement for "reasonable and necessary" care theoretically might be 
interpreted to permit an ELT to be denied a particular patient if, in that patient's case, treatment 
were deemed "unreasonable" or "unnecessary." No court has ruled on this issue, although Justice 
Stevens, dissenting in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 355 (!980), stated: 
"There are some especially costly forms of treatment that may reasonably be excluded 
from the [Medicaid] program in order to preserve the assets in the pool and extend its 
benefits to the maximum number of needy persons. Fiscal considerations may compel 
certain difficult choices in order to improve the protection afforded to the entire benefit-
ted class." 
ld. at 355. Under Justice Stevens' formulation, a costly treatment could not be provided to only 
some Medicaid patients "to preserve the assets in the pool" because this would not protect "the 
entire benefitted class" (emphasis added). 
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able" lives. 7 5 Other examples of identifiable lives are persons lost at sea, 
trapped miners, and downed balloonists. In all these cases, an event has 
occurred-such as a disease or accident-that has placed a specific per-
son's life in jeopardy, and a lifesaving opportunity-or an opportunity 
to employ a lifesaving resource-has arisen. 76 
In contrast, other lifesaving resources save "statistical" lives. 77 
When a decision is made on whether to provide a resource-for exam-
ple, whether to install airbags in new cars-it is impossible to say who 
will be involved in an accident. The most that can be said about a spe-
cific individual is a set of probabilities: the probability that he will be 
involved in a potentially fatal situation; the probability that he will die 
without the lifesaving resource if he becomes involved; and so forth. 
Hence the term "statistical" lives. 78 Other examples of statistical life-
saving resources include automobile seatbelts and workplace safety 
standards. 79 
Central to an appreciation of the cost of rationing EL Ts is one 
further distinction between statistical and identifiable lives: identifiable 
lives traditionally are regarded as worth saving at virtually any cost. 
75. One of the main lobbying tactics by end-stage renal disease victims to secure passage 
of the Social Security Amendments of 1972 was to portray themselves as "identifiable" lives. See 
Rettig, supra note 14, al 220 ("A New York City resident testified and was dialyzed before the 
House Ways and Means Committee in November 1971, a demonstration which apparently con-
tributed to the willingness of Representative Wilbur Mills to support a kidney disease amendment 
to Medicare"). 
76. As long as a specific person is involved, an identifiable life also can be at slake even if 
the person's identity is unknown, as in automobile accidents where it is not known who is in the 
car. 
77. For a discussion of identifiable versus statistical lives, see Fried, The Value of Life, 82 
1-IARv. L. REv. 1415 (1969); Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping With Quality/Cost Trade-Offs In 
Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 6, 21-25 (1975). 
78. Whether an identifiable or a statistical life is at stake in deciding to allocate an EL T 
depends on one's vantage point. To a government official deciding whether or not to provide a 
particular EL T under Medicare, the potential EL T recipients on the whole appear to be statistical; 
while the official may be acquainted with particular patients who need the resource, his decision 
will primarily affect as-yet unspecified individuals in the future. To the health care professionals 
who treat these future patients, however, the patients will be identifiable. The patients also will be 
identifiable to a judge who reviews a decision to deny the EL T to a specific patient. See infra notes 
236-48, 255 and accompanying text. 
What distinguishes resources such as EL Ts from statistical lifesaving resources is that there 
is always a point at which to. intervene with an ELT to save an identifiable life. With a statistical 
resource (such as an airbag) on the other hand, there will never be an opportunity to save an 
identifiable life. At the point a statistical life is placed at a high and immediate risk of death-or 
becomes "identifiable"-it is too late to provide a statistical resource. For example, it is too late to 
install an airbag after a crash occurs, and it is too late to install fire stairs once a building has 
caught on fire. 
79. Cf Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983) (invalidating 
National Highway Transportation Safety Board rescision of rule requiring passive automobile 
restraints). 
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Enormous sums are spent to rescue downed balloonists, mountain 
climbers, trapped miners, and the like. 80 Therefore, identifiable lives at 
risk seem to trigger a "lifesaving imperative." On the other hand, a far 
more detached cost-benefit approach is taken toward saving statistical 
lives. 81 Society seems much more willing to permit statistical deaths. 
A number of explanations have been suggested for the lifesaving 
imperative that attaches to saving identifiable lives. Some theories point 
to our emotional reaction to visible tragedy82 and to our preference for 
focusing on present rather than future problems. 83 Other rationales are 
more abstract, such as Professor Fried's identification of the unique 
suffering of the victim who knows he is going to die. 84 Whatever the 
reasons, the power of this imperative is undeniable. 85 It is so compel-
ling that heroic efforts are made to rescue even persons like mountain 
climbers who deliberately have placed themselves in jeopardy. 86 In-
deed, many people spend great sums of money and even risk their lives 
to save strangers. 
The sacrifice and expense evoked by the lifesaving imperative is a 
measure not only of what society is willing to pay to save an identifiable 
life but also of what it would cost to abandon such a life by rationing 
ELTs. "To the extent that our lives and institutions depend on the no-
tion that life is beyond price, ... a refusal to save lives is horribly 
costly. " 87 While little of this cost represents money that would actually 
80. Occasionally, the government will spend substantial funds even in advance of a spe-
cific rescue in recognition of society's willingness to spend money to save identifiable lives when a 
tragedy occurs. For example, the U.S. government in Aprill983 launched a $54 million satellite to 
facilitate rescues at sea. The satellite, however, malfunctioned shortly after launch. See U.S. Lofts 
a Satellite to Find Planes and Ships, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1983, at A14, col. 6. 
81. Cf Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983). One reason that 
the National Highway Transportation Safety Board may have attempted to rescind the passive 
restraint rule was the cost-per-statistical-life-saved of the program, which the Board estimated at 
$480,000. See Comments of William Nordhaus on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards for Occupant Crash Protection, National Highway Transporta-
tion Safety Board Docket No. 74-14, app. A-5 (1981). 
82. See Glover, Causing Deaths and Saving Lives, in VALUING LIFE, supra note 45, at 246 
(difficult to ignore televised interview with family of trapped miner); Havighurst, supra note 31, at 
141 n.81 (rescued rower generally gives more dramatic and moving interview than a better pro-
tected motorist). 
83. See Glover, supra note 82, at 246. 
84. See Fried, supra note 77, at 1434-37. 
85. See Havighurst, supra note 31, at 141 ("Our treating identified victims differently 
from statistical victims should not be dismissed as a simple case of hypocrisy or as a mistake in 
valuing lives, for it is in large part a ritual homage paid to the sanctity of human life and to our 
collective commitment to maintain it" [footnote omitted]). 
86. This argues a·gainst a rationing scheme that penalizes those who in some sense are 
responsible for their own illnesses, such as cigarette smokers who develop lung cancer. See infra 
notes 156-57 and accompanying text. 
87. G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 53, at 39. 
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be spent as a result of rationing, this does not reduce the cost any more 
than the fact that a rescuer pays with his life rather than with his 
pocketbook. 
Despite the lifesaving imperative, however, society might be will-
ing to ration ELTs if rationing costs could be reduced sufficiently. The 
next section discusses the potential rationing methods that might be 
employed to reduce rationing costs to an acceptable level. 
B. Methods of Rationing 
1. SOCIAL WORTH ALLOCATION 
Under social worth allocation, ELTs would be given only to those 
patients who meet certain social performance criteria. These criteria 
could focus on past performance, so that the resource might be given 
only to those persons who had made valuable social contributions, such 
as respected artists, scientists, politicians or businessmen. Conversely, 
persons who had engaged in undesirable behavior, such as criminals, 
would be disqualified and allowed to die. Alternatively, allocation 
could be based on expected performance; the resource could be allo-
cated to those expected to make valuable social contributions, but not 
to persons whose future activities were likely to be of little social value. 
ELTs also might be allocated on the basis of both past and future per-
formance; a famous scientist who intended to remain active might be 
preferred over one who had retired. 88 
A social worth approach might be employed for every patient 
seeking an ELT. 89 During the 1960's, for example, some hemodialysis 
machines were allocated on this basis. Considerable public outcry re-
sulted. Attention focused on the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center, which 
selected patients for hemodialysis on the basis of, among other things, 
" ... age and sex of patient; marital status and number of dependents; 
income; net worth; emotional stability, with particular regard to the 
patient's capacity to accept treatment; educational background; the na-
ture of occupation; past performance and future potential; the names of 
people who could serve as references. " 90 The Center's allocation deci-
88. Allocation according to future performance might be said to maximize social utility, 
whereas allocation according to past performance could be said to have achieved social justice. See 
Rescher, The Allocation of Exotic Medical Life-Saving Therapy, in VALUING LIFE, supra note 45, at 
230-31. Both types of allocation are utilitarian; however, an approach based on achieving social 
justice reinforces socially useful behavior in the future. See G. WINSLOW, supra note 10, at 84-85. 
89. It has been argued that ELTs must be allocated on the basis of past and future 
performance in order to be ethical. See Rescher, supra note 88, at 231. 
90. Alexander, supra note 41. See also Rettig, supra note 14, at 203 n.23. One physician 
has recommended conducting opinion surveys to develop an "Index of Human Social Value" to be 
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sian-makers became known, understandably, as the "Seattle God 
Committee."91 They were criticized for preferring patients who had 
been scout leaders and Sunday school teachers. 92 In the words of one 
pair of commentators, their policies ruled out "creative nonconform-
ists, who rub the bourgeoisie the wrong way but who historically have 
contributed so much to the making of America. The Pacific Northwest 
is no place for a Henry David Thoreau with bad kidneys." 93 
Rather than being employed in all cases, social worth criteria 
might be applied only in exceptional cases to make sure that ELTs were 
given to especially deserving persons or were denied to those who were 
especially undesirable. According to one report, for example, hemodial-
ysis treatments during the late 1960's specifically were denied to a pros-
titute, a drug peddler, and a psychotic who had escaped from a prison 
hospital. 94 
Allocating ELTs on a social worth basis is unquestionably appeal-
ing, at least in extreme cases. It is difficult to imagine denying an ELT to 
a head of state, especially if the ELT were allocated instead to a con-
victed murderer. 95 Even in less extreme cases, it is compelling to think 
of saving the life of someone who has been helpful to others or who has 
exhibited other virtues. 96 However, a social worth approach to allocat-
ing EL Ts encounters several serious obstacles. First, especially as less 
differentiated or extreme cases are considered, it is difficult to make 
comparative judgments between social traits: we lack a rating scale of 
desert. 97 All might agree that a brilliant cancer researcher ought to be 
preferred over a derelict, but should the cancer researcher be preferred 
employed in allocating ELTs. Shatin, Medical Care and the Social Worth of a Man, 36 AM. J. 
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 96, 98 (1966). He suggests that the following values be included in the index, 
although not necessarily in order of relative importance: 
"(I) The economic productivity of the person when well; (2) Age and productive years 
left; (3) Marital and family status and responsibility; (4) Responsibility for the welfare of 
others; (5) Medical prognosis and outlook for full recovery; (6) Children, friends, social 
and community relationships; (7) Society's need for his services; (8) Considerations 
based on potential contributions to society; (9) History ofantisocial·behavior; (10) Con-
tribution to the cultural stream of humanity and all the areas of human endeavor: arts, 
sciences, humanities, economics, governance." 
Id. at 99. 
91. See G. CALABRES! & P. BOBBITT, supra note 53, at 187. 
92. Robbins & Robbins, The Rest are Simply Left to Die, REDBOOK, Nov. 1967, at 
132-33, cited in Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney 
Transplantation, 15 UCLA L. REv. 357,377 (1968). 
93. Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 92, at 378. 
94. See Note, supra note I I, at 654. 
95. The problem of extreme cases is discussed below in connection with egalitarian allo-
cation approaches. See inji'a notes 155-57 and accompanying text. 
96. However, social worth based on past performance would be of little help in allocat-
ing ELTs to newborns, who have no social track record. See Childress, supra note 10, at 547-61. 
97. See supra note 90 for a suggestion that such a scale be created by opinion poll. 
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over a politician, or a philosopher? Is a famous novelist more deserving 
than a famous poet?98 These distinctions become even less manageable 
if future rather than only past behavior is the basis for the allocation 
decision, since then we not only have to compare relative merit, but also 
must predict future performance. Suppose a promising talent is chosen 
over a n'er-do-well, and the talent is never realized? On the other hand, 
how often is it said of a person who accomplishes something: who 
would have expected it of him? 
So far, only value-laden social traits such as relative social worth 
have been discussed in the context of social worth allocation. But simi-
lar conceptual problems arise even when seemingly value-neutral at-
tributes are considered. An example is age comparisons. 99 A preference 
.for youth might be desirable because it would maximize the length, and 
not simply the number, of lives saved. 100 But older persons may be of 
greater benefit to society by virtue of their experience. Moreover, an 
upper limit on the age of those eligible to receive ELTs-unless set so 
high that it had little rationing utility-could result in the death of some 
elderly high achievers whom all might wish to save. 101 
In addition to raising the foregoing practical problems, social 
worth allocation probably is socially unacceptable. First, those making 
microallocation decisions have a strong tendency to prefer patients 
with whom they identify; if the decision-makers are well-educated and 
well-to-do professionals, an allocation system in which the patient's so-
cial worth were a factor would be likely to prefer patients with high 
socio-economic status. 102 Minority groups and the underprivileged 
might be underrepresented. 103 
98. Nor can these dilemmas be avoided by establishing minimum standards for receiving 
an ELT rather than relying on comparative judgments between patients, at least so long as social 
utility is the primary allocation criterion. For example, if we decided to pay for 10 hemodialysis 
machines and there were II patients, we cannot decide ahead of time to give the machines to the I 0 
who had never been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, since the II th person may be similarly 
unblemished. Obviously, if we know in advance that only 10 of the II patients fulfill a certain 
criterion and choose to allocate machines on that basis, we are comparing their social worth 
against the social worth of the 11th and thus engaging in comparative rather than standards-based 
allocation. 
99. During the hemodialysis treatment shortage of the 1960's, machines routinely were 
denied to persons under or over certain ages because they allegedly were unsuited medically. See 
Note, supra note II, at 643-45. Age-based rationing may be an important option since the increas-
ing age of the U.S. population makes the elderly the potential recipients of an increasingly greater 
proportion of medical resources, and pressures may build to deny ELTs routinely to persons over 
a certain age. 
100. See Note, supra note 11, at 665. 
101. Grandma Moses, it will be recalled, did not begin painting until she was 78 years old. 
See 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA Grandma Moses 46 (15th ed. 1974) (Micropedia). 
102. See Note, supra note 11, at 662. 
103. See Note, supra note 29, at 1329-30. 
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Again, this is illustrated by the example of the allocation of 
hemodialysis treatments. In the 1960's, machines often were allocated 
to patients on the basis of social worth. 104 Following the passage of the 
1972 Social Security Amendments, however, treatment was available 
regardless of social utility considerations 105 to virtually all patients 
who needed it. The resulting change in a number of the social and dem-
ographic characteristics of the patients receiving hemodialysis is strik-
ing. In 1967, only 7% of the patients receiving hemodialysis were black; 
by 1978, the percentage of blacks had increased to 34.9%. Over this 
same period, the percentage of women receiving hemodialysis more 
than doubled; by 1978, women comprised approximately half of the 
treatment population. Only 5% of the patients in 1967 were separated, 
divorced or widowed, in contrast to 25% in 1978. Finally, the percent-
age of patients with prior high school education or less was only 10% in 
1967; in 1978, the figure had climbed to almost 30%. 106 
Reliance on social worth factors also is repugnant to those who 
believe that all human life is worthwhile. 107 Social worth allocation is 
attacked because it contravenes the basic principle of human equality, 
and degrades the human spirit. 108 While these objections may seem 
weak in comparison to the harsh demands of medical cost containment, 
there clearly would be strong public opposition on "humanitarian" 
grounds-including opposition from organizations such as the Ameri-
104. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. 
105. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
106. 
Percentage of Hemodialysis Patient Populations in 1967 and 1978 
with Cer1ain Social and Demo~raphic Characteristics 
Characteristic 1967 1978 
Male 75 49.2 
Female 25 50.8 
White 91 63.7 
Black 7 34.9 
Junior high school 
education or less 10 28.7 
Separated, divorced or 
widowed 5 25.2 
Based on data in Evans, supra note 5, at 488. 
107. See G. WINSLOW, supra note 10, at 81-83. 
108. See e.g., VALUING LIFE, supra note 45, at 210 ("Ultimately it dulls and perhaps even 
eliminates the sense of the person's transcendence, his dignity as a person which cannot be reduced 
to his past or future contribution to society"). 
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can Medical Association 109 -to allocating ELTs on a social worth 
basis. 110 
!d. 
109. See American Medical Association Opinions, supra note 54, at 2: 
"Limited health care resources should be allocated efficiently and on the basis of fair, 
acceptable, and humanitarian criteria. Priority should be given to persons who are most 
likely to be treated successfully or have long term benefit. Social worth is not an appro-
priate criterion. 
Utility or relative worth to society should not determine whether an individual is ac-
cepted as a donor or recipient of tissue for transplantation, selected for human experi-
mentation, or denied or given preference in receiving scarce health care treatment or 
resources." 
110. A related issue is whether allocation based on social utility would be lawful (assum-
ing that rationing, regardless of the method used, is not per se unlawful, see infra notes 221-54 and 
accompanying text). A number of statutes apparently preclude social worth comparisons between 
patients. The federal End-Stage Renal Disease Program, for example, extends Medicare coverage 
to "every individual" who meets certain eligibility requirements (principally, being covered under 
the Social Security program) and who is medically determined to have the disease. See 42 U.S.C. § 
426-l(a) (1982). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(l) (1982) (Medicare reimbursement for all "reason-
able and necessary" items or services provided to eligible individuals); 38 U.S.C. §§ 601-28 (1982) 
(no restrictions in services to be provided veterans for service-related injuries or disease.) 
In situations not covered under a specific statutory or regulatory provision, a social worth 
approach might be barred by the United States Constitution, depending on the factual context in 
which the allocation took place, and on the specific substantive bases for the allocation decision. 
In the constitutional analysis, the first issue would be whether the allocation was made by 
the government or by private individuals or entities. If the action were deemed to be private, then it 
would not be subject to constitutional constraints. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 
(1982) (fourteenth amendment does not control purely private conduct, such as a decision qy 
nursing home to transfer Medicaid patients to lower level of care). 
A more difficult question is presented by rationing by ostensibly private health care institu-
tions that are subject to government regulation or that receive government funds. There has been 
considerable debate in the courts, for example, on whether receipt of government funds makes 
otherwise private hospitals subject to the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See, e.g., Modaber v. 
Culpepper Memorial Hosp., 674 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1982) (receipt of Medicare, Medicaid and 
Hill-Burton [federal construction] funds does not make hospital actions state actions); Newsom v. 
Vanderbilt Univ., 653 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1981) (same). But see Davis v. Ball Memorial Hosp., 640 
F.2d 30,43 (7th Cir. 1980) (indigent patients have enforceable interest under due process clause in 
compliance by private hospital with Hill-Burton requirements for allocating care to indigents). In 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), the Supreme Court stated that actions by such institutions 
are only attributable to the state when three conditions are met: first, the state must in some sense 
be responsible for the specific action. Jd. at 1004 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 
U.S. 345 (1974)). Second, mere approval or acquiescence by the state in a private action is insuffi-
cient to establish state action; the state must exercise coercive power or provide significant overt or 
covert encouragement. Jd. at 1004-05. Finally, the action must be in an area that is exclusively the 
prerogative of the state. !d. at 1005. 
It is unlikely that a decision by a private hospital or physician to allocate an ELTon the 
basis of social utility would meet all three of these conditions. Even though the hospital or doctor 
may be receiving public funds, and may be subject to numerous government regulations, the allo-
cation decision is unlikely to be regarded as one for which the state is responsible, or which the 
state has coerced or significantly encouraged. And even if the state brought about the allocation 
decision in some sense, for example, if it were made in order to comply with a government-man-
dated ceiling on hospital costs, see infra note 220, it is doubtful that the provision of health care--
even to needy individuals-would be regarded as the exclusive prerogative of the state. Cf Maher 
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2. MARKET MECHANISMS 
Another possible way to allocate ELTs is to allow the market to 
establish a price for them, and sell ELTs only to those who can afford 
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) ("The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay 
... any of the medical expenses of indigents."). 
On the other hand, if the allocation were made by a government-run health care facility such 
as a public or Veterans Administration hospital, or by a government employee in the scope of his 
employment, it would clearly be subject to constitutional requirements. The same is true if the 
rationing decision were made by a private facility or physician but was required by law or regula-
tion. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004. In these cases, allocating ELTs on the basis of 
social utility considerations might run afoul of the equal protection requirements of the 
constitution. 
Certain characteristics, if they form the basis of a governmental distinction between individ-
uals, are regarded as "suspect classifications" which are strictly scrutinized by the courts and likely 
to be struck down. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Additionally, the courts will subject to a high standard of 
scrutiny governmental actions which affect certain "fundamental interests," such as the right to 
interstate travel. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618. Suspect classifications include distinctions based 
on race, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (invalidating state law against interracial 
marriages); alienage, see e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (I 973) (state cannot deny otherwise 
qualified alien admission to the bar); and religion, see, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 
(1951) (access to public park may not be denied to Jehovah's Witnesses). If a governmental action 
under the guise of social utility denied a person an ELTon the basis of a suspect classification, the 
action would probably be invalidated by the courts. See, e.g., Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & 
Nonsectarian Hosp., 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967) (racially segregated wards in publicly-supported 
hospital unconstitutional); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964) (racially segregated 
treatment facilities unconstitutional). 
Indeed, under the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, !983, 2000b, 2000e, (1982) even 
private discrimination in access to ELTs on overt grounds of race, color, religion or national origin 
might be impermissible. In Hall v. Bio-Medical Application, Inc., 671 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1982), for 
example, the plaintiff challenged the refusal of a private hemodialysis outpatient facility to treat 
him. The plaintiff, who was black, alleged that the facility's action was in part racially motivated, 
thereby violating 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). In support, he introduced testimony of former employ-
ees of the facility that whites were given priority over blacks in the scheduling of treatments. With-
out discussing the testimony of these employees, the Eighth Circuit rejected the§ 1981 claim, 
finding that the facility had terminated the plaintiff's treatments because of his disruptive behavior. 
Hall, 671 F.2d at 302. 
A legislature or health care provider today is unlikely to allocate ELTs overtly on the basis 
of a suspect classification such as race. However, it is quite possible that allocation ostensibly on 
the basis of arguably nonsuspect social utility criteria, such as past or future performance, would 
result in a disproportionate allocation of the EL T along one or more suspect lines. As noted ear-
lier, allocation of hemodialysis machines in the 1960's on the basis of various social utility and 
other considerations resulted in a disproportionate number of whites receiving treatment (91 %) 
compared to blacks (7%). See supra note 106 and accompanying table. Yet there is no direct 
evidence that race actually was used as an allocation criterion. Consequently, a pivotal question is 
whether allocation decisions can be considered invalid when the net result is that one racial group 
receives the treatment far more often than another group. 
In two cases, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Div. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) and 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court suggested that the mere fact that 
one racial group is disadvantaged compared to another is not enough to invalidate action as ra-
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them. Private and governmental health insurance may cover the bulk of 
payments under this approach, in which case only patients with inade-
quate insurance or personal financial resources would be denied treat-
ment. 111 Allocating ELTs on the basis of wealth might be regarded as 
cially discriminatory; a discriminatory purpose must also be demonstrated. Ar/inglon Heighls, 429 
U.S. at 264-68; Washing/on, 426 U.S. at 238-48. In Arlinglon Heigh is, the Court went on to identify 
different types of evidence that might demonstrate a discriminatory purpose, including whether 
there was a clear pattern of discrimination and the historical background of the action. Arlington 
Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68. It is conceivable that the hemodialysis rationing decisions of the 
1960's that produced racially-skewed results would-if challenged today-be invalidated as a vio-
lation of equal protection, but the plaintiff would clearly bear a heavy burden in establishing the 
existence of a discriminatory purpose. 
Other than a classification based on suspect criteria, a social utility preference between pa-
tients in need of ELTs faces only limited judicial scrutiny. In general, courts only require that the 
classification be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r 
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74 (1979) (suggesting that a somewhat stricter standard 
would be applied in evaluating the constitutionality of sex-based classifications); Mass. Bd. of 
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976) (upholding a state statute establishing a man-
datory retirement age of 50 for state police on the basis that it promoted physical fitness in the 
police force). Allocating EL Ts on the basis of social utility might be defended on the ground that 
social utility was a rational means to achieve the legitimate purpose of conserving scarce medical 
resources. While a court could reject this defense if it concluded that, perhaps because of the 
practical difficulties discussed earlier, see supra notes 88-10 I and accompanying text, most patients 
cannot rationally be distinguished from one another on social utility grounds, it is noteworthy 
that, in recent times, courts have not invalidated classification schemes other than those based on 
suspect criteria. See Blumstein, Ralioning Aiedical Resources: A Constitulional, Legal, and Policy 
Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1345, 1382 (1981). 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the Court in Murgia sustained an "irrebuttable presumption" 
that troopers over the age of 50 were physically unfit for the job. The Court noted that it was 
impossible for an individual officer to disprove the presumption through individual testing. 
Murgia. 427 U.S. at 316. Similarly, ELTs might be allocated on the basis of irrebuttable presump-
tions. For example, during the 1960's, hemodialysis machines routinely were denied to persons 
over and under certain ages. See Note, supra note 11, at 643-45. Irrebuttable presumptions are in 
fact a common decision-making approach in our society, especially when based on age (e.g., mini-
mum drinking, driving, and voting ages). At one lime the Court took the position that at least 
certain irrebuttable presumptions were unconstitutional as a violation of due process. See Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidating mandatory pregnancy leave for 
teachers); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (I 973) (invalidating preferential tuition rates for state 
residents). The Court soon reaffirmed the validity of such presumptions, however. See Weinberger 
v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (permitting certain Social Security eligibility requirements based on 
duration-of-relationship). It is questionable whether the Court would resurrect the irrebuttable 
presumption doctrine to invalidate EL T allocations. 
Ill. EL T costs are likely to exceed the amounts reimbursed under federal or private in-
surance programs, so that some personal expenditures would be necessary even for patients with 
insurance coverage. For example, Medicare only pays 80% of the charges for hemodialysis at a 
renal dialysis facility; the remaining 20% must be paid by the patient or through other insurance 
programs. See42 U.S.C. § !395rr(b)(2)(A) (1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 21,254,21,255 (1983) (Final Rule 
on Prospective Reimbursement for Dialysis Services under Medicare End Stage Renal Disease 
Program). Moreover, patients receiving hemodialysis must be hooked up to a machine several 
times a week for a number of hours. Consequently, patients receiving treatments at a hospital or 
dialysis center, rather than at home, are often unable to hold a job. See Hearings on Naliona/ 
Health Insurance, supra note 40, at 1538 (testimony of Shep Glazer). 
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another way of allocating them on the basis of social utility, on the 
theory that wealth-at least in the form of current remuneration-is a 
crude measure of how much society values a person's activities or po-
tential.112 As a measure of social utility, wealth offers substantial ad-
ministrative advantages over other utilitarian allocation approaches: 
allocation critelia-in the form of prices-are relatively easy to estab-
lish, and distinctions between patients are simplified by being quantita-
tive-in the form of how much money patients have-rather than 
qualitative. 
On the other hand, in the 1960's, at least one hemodialysis center 
that allocated treatment on the basis of social utility considerations re·-
garded wealth as a negative factor. It reasoned that the death of a 
wealthy person would not fall so heavily on his dependents. 113 And 
wealth is not a very accurate measure of how highly a person is re-
garded by society; for example, many public officials would be under-
valued unless intangible rewards, such as power and status, were also 
taken into account. Yet differentiating patients on the basis of measures 
such as power and status tends to create the same valuation problems as 
allocating ELTs on the basis of social utility in general: how is power 
quantified, for example, so that it can be compared with wealth? Fi-
nally, wealth is not even a crude measure of moral desert; the saintly are 
not likely to be rich, and philanthropists score high on virtue because of 
what they have given away, not because of what they have kept. 
Moreover, at least a substantial segment of the population vvould 
regard allocating ELTs strictly on the basis of wealth as morally repug-
nant. 114 This, in turn, might translate into political unacceptability. 
For example, during the 1960's, wealth was a widely-used, if little ac-
knowledged, basis for allocating hemodialysis treatments to victims of 
Note that if the price of the EL T were high enough, some patients who might actually have 
sufficient wealth to purchase an EL T may decide to forego treatment in order to purchase an 
alternate resource or to conserve their estate. For example, ·a patient may prefer a round-the-world 
cruise to an extra year of life on a dialyzer. Thus, one advantage of a market approach is to allow 
patients to decide for themselves what type of expenditure will maximize their personal utility. Of 
course, this choice is not available to those who cannot afford the ELT. 
112. See Rhoads, How Much Should We Spend to Save a Life, in VALUING LIFE, supra 
note 45, at 197 ("[T]he hard-nosed market economist is likely to see wealth and current salary as at 
least rough proxies of retrospective and prospective contributions to society"). Accord Shatin, 
supra note 90, at 97. Even assuming that wealth were a valid measure of a person's value to society, 
this would only be true of earned and not of inherited wealth. 
113. See Note, supra note II, at 658 n.J95. 
114. Commentators have made various suggestions for reducing the ethical problems 
with wealth-based allocation, such as subsidizing the poor to make them better able to afford 
health care, see Rhoads, supra note 112, at 298, and requiring the wealthy to sponsor care for those 
who would not otherwise receive it. See G. WINSLOW, supra note 10, at 157-58. These approaches 
are to some extent embodied in government health insurance programs, which are financed with 
revenue from progressive taxation. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
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end-stage renal disease. Virtually any patient who could afford a dialy-
sis machine (costing approximately $3,000) and the service charges of 
the treatments (as much as $300 each) could obtain hemodialysis.U 5 
End-stage renal disease victims mounted a vigorous lobbying campaign 
in Congress, emphasizing the high costs of hemodialysis, 116 which led 
to passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1972. 117 Since then, 
most patients with end-stage renal disease have had the bulk of their 
hemodialysis treatment costs paid for by Medicare. As a result, patients 
who previously might have been unable to afford treatment are now 
able to survive. 118 
The unpopularity of allocating ELTs on the basis of wealth is dem-
onstrated by numerous government programs aimed at providing 
health care to those too poor to pay. Medicare and Medicaid embody 
this policy, as do recent congressional efforts to provide health insur-
ance coverage to the temporarily unemployed. 119 Considerable na-
tional attention also has been given to establishing a program of federal 
catastrophic health insurance. 12° Furthermore, the President's Com-
mission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research has issued a report calling for the nation to 
meet an ethical obligation of providing an adequate level of health care 
to alU 21 
In view of the strong popular bias against allocating health re-
sources on the basis of wealth, it is unlikely that a government facility 
or program would explicitly ration ELTs on the basis of ability to pay. 
Imagine the public reaction if, during World War II, the government 
had given penicillin only to those who had purchased the greatest 
115. Telephone interview with Ira Greifer, M.D., Medical Director, National Kidney 
Foundation, (June 28, 1983). If necessary, the patients sometimes paid a physician to purchase the 
machine. The physician could then make the machine available-at additional charge-to other 
patients. 
116. See, e.g., Hearings on National Health Insurance, supra note 40, at 1524-46. 
117. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
118. In 1967, before passage of the legislation, only 9% of the hemodialysis population 
had incomes below the poverty level, and 47% had incomes below the median family income level. 
In 1978, however, 36% of the patients receiving hemodialysis were below the poverty level in 
income, while 71% had incomes below the median family income level. See Evans, supra note 5, at 
989-90. 
I 19. See, e.g., H.R. 3021, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
120. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 0FF1CE, CATASTROPHIC MEDICAL EXPENSES: PAT-
TERNS IN THE NoN-ELDERLY, NoN-POOR POPULATION (1982); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 
PROTECTION FROM CATASTROPHIC MEDICAL EXPENSES: THE EFFECTS OF LIMITING FAMILY LIABILITY 
UNDER THE EXISTING EMPWYEE INSURANCE PROGRAMS (1981 Working Paper). 
121. See SECURING AccESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note l. The report did not focus on 
ELTs. 
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amount of war bonds. 122 Implicit or private rationing on the basis of 
market mechanisms may proliferate for a time, but this type of ration-
122. Even though it was technologically rather than merely economically scarce, penicil-
lin is an apt example because of the degree of government involvement in its production and 
distribution during the war. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
If a wealth-based allocation system nonetheless were adopted, it is uncertain whether it 
would be struck down on equal protection grounds. (The question of whether it would violate 
procedural due process requirements would depend on how the program were implemented. See 
infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.) On the basis of James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) 
and Dandridge v .. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), it might be concluded that wealth was not a 
suspect classification under equal protection doctrine. See G. GUNTIIER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 
961-63 (lOth ed. 1980). In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973) how-
ever, the Supreme Court distinguished the Texas school financing scheme upheld in that case from 
other wealth-based classifications that it had struck down in the past on the basis that persons or 
classes illegally discriminated against were completely unable to pay for a desired benefit, and as a 
result, were absolutely unable to obtain it. Jd. at 20. The Court implied that, when these two 
conditions obtained, it would be inclined to view the wealth classification in question as suspect, at 
least if the classification resulted in deprivation of a "fundamental" right. 
Allocation of an ELT by the government on the basis of wealth would fulfill Rodriguez's first 
two conditions: at least where the government controlled the availability of the resource, selling it 
to the highest bidder would utterly preclude less wealthy patients from obtaining it, and they 
would soon die. The question would then be whether the patients in that situation have a suffi-
ciently fundamental interest or right at stake so that the state could not allocate ELTs on the basis 
of wealth absent a compelling state interest. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634 (1969). It 
might seem self-evident that a patient's interest in remaining alive is fundamental. Cases address-
ing the issue of whether life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn upon the request of a patient, 
his kin or guardian recognize that the state has a strong interest in preserving life. See, e.g., Super-
intendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E. 2d 417 (1977). However, the 
courts have not confronted this issue in the equal protection context, and recent pronouncements 
by the Supreme Court in due process cases cast some doubt on whether a fundamental interest in 
life would be recognized. See supra note 110. The Court almost certainly would deny that a patient 
had a constitutional right to an EL Tin the sense that the state was obligated to provide it to all in 
need. Cf Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,469 (1977) ("The Constitution imposes no obligation on the 
Stales to pay ... any of the medical expenses of indigents."). 
If a wealth-based allocation of EL Ts by the government nevertheless were scrutinized 
strictly by the courts, the government might have difficulty showing that the allocation scheme was 
necessary to fulfill a compelling state interest. In the penicillin example, the government might 
argue that allocation on the basis of who bought the rnost war bonds was necessary to fulfill the 
compelling interest of funding the war. However, the Supreme Court has determined that fiscal 
considerations ordinarily are not sufficient to sustain a suspect classification. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. 
at 632-33. Even though national survival might well be a compelling objective, it is questionable 
whether selling ELTs-as opposed to other forms of war financing-would be deemed necessary. 
If the example were changed somewhat, the government's compelling interest argument 
might become stronger. Suppose the wealth-based allocation was defended on the ground that the 
state can refuse to give the resource to those who cannot afford it in order to maximize health care; 
if the state had to subsidize the poor, it might be argued, important preventive programs such as 
immunization might have to be shut down for lack of funds. See Note, supra note 29, at 1333-34. 
The compelling interest presumably would be the utilitarian objective of providing the greatest 
health care to the greatest number. But the government would still have difficulty demonstrating 
why a wealth-based ELT allocation scheme was necessary to provide funds for other programs, 
i.e., why the funds could not come from some other source, such as another part of the health care 
budget. 
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ing is also likely to lead to demands for government equalization of 
access. 
3. MEDICAL CRITERIA 
Several rationing approaches suggest allocating ELTs on the basis 
of medical criteria, determined by physicians or other health care pro-
fessionals.123 In most cases the judgment of medical professionals will 
initially determine which patients are suitable candidates, or competi-
tors, for ELTs. 124 
Medical criteria might also be used to establish priorities of need. 
During the shortage of hemodialysis machines in the 1960's, for exam-
ple, doctors usually gave machines first to those patients who were in 
immediate danger of death, all other factors being equal. 125 
There can be little dispute that at least some exercise of medical 
judgment is appropriate in deciding how to allocate ELTs. In the most 
basic sense, the patient's disease must be correctly diagnosed. More-
over, it may make little sense to give a patient an ELT if the patient is 
clearly going to die in the short run as a result of another condition. 126 
Allocation based on medical criteria becomes more difficult, how-
ever, if medical distinctions are employed as a rationing instrument. 
The health care professional then must establish a system of patient 
priorities, which entails a number of hard choices. It is difficult to deter-
mine, for example, whether the potential resource should be provided 
first to the worst-off case, to the patient likely to benefit the most from 
it, or to the patient who needs less of the resource-such as less recovery 
time in intensive care-so that more of the resource will be available for 
123. See. e.g., Breeden v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 734, 737 (M.D. La. 1974) (" ... 
under the Medicare provisions of the Social Security Act, Congress intended that the responsibil-
ity for determining what services the patient requires rests primarily with the treating physician"); 
Mulley, supra note 7, at 300 ("There is no doubt that physicians are the key decision-makers on the 
demand side within the hospital"). 
124. One commentator defines this initial determination as deciding whether or not the 
patient has a "reasonable prospect of responding to treatment." VALUING LIFE, supra note 45, at 
207. It is possible that the patient initially could decide to seek an ELT without consulting a physi-
cian, but, unless the resource were made available to all who wanted it rather than just to those 
who needed it, at some point a medical evaluation of the patient's suitability and need for the 
resource would be likely. 
125. Telephone interview with Ira Greifer, M.D., Medical Director, National Kidney 
Foundation (June 28, I 983). The establishment of priorities for treatment based on medical need is 
the primary function of triage, the classic form of emergency medical resource allocation. See 
supra note I 0 and accompanying text. 
126. See infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text. A separate question is whether to 
allocate an ELT to a patient who is not expected to recover even minimal functionality. See infra 
note 278 and accompanying text. 
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others. 12 7 Suppose patient A is 25 years old, and thus can expect an-
other 45 years of life if he successfully receives the ELT, while patient B 
is 65. What if, due to complications, patient C will be confined to a 
wheelchair all his life even if he gets the resource, while patient D will be 
able to resume a completely normal routine?128 In the foregoing case, 
what if patient Cis a professional mountain climber? The initial appeal 
of allocating ELTs based on medical criteria diminishes when medical 
judgments must discriminate among patients competing for the same 
scarce resource; yet patient comparisons are at the heart of the EL T 
allocation dilemma. 
Another problem with allocating ELTs on the basis of medical cri-
teria is that there may be a difference of opinion among physicians 
about which patients should receive the EL Ts. Patients considered inel-
igible by one doctor or group of doctors might find another doctor or 
group who would disagree; in an allocation system based on medical 
judgment, it is difficult to ascertain which opinion would determine 
whether the patient received the ELT. For example, in one study in the 
United Kingdom, 25 nephrologists were asked to pick 30 out of 40 pa-
tients, on the basis of ostensibly medical criteria, to be treated for kid-
ney disease. Only 13 of the 40 patients were selected for treatment by all 
of the doctors, and no patient was rejected by all. 129 The problem of 
physician disagreement might be overcome by devising rigid, pre-estab-
lished medical standards for allocating ELTs, but these standards 
might be too inflexible to accommodate the disease variations that 
might be encountered. 130 
Additionally, there is the danger that, in the guise of allocating 
ELTs on the basis of medical criteria, physicians will select patients at 
least in part on the basis of unarticulated social worth comparisons. As 
discussed earlier, there is a tendency to prefer treating patients with 
whom one identifies. 131 Physicians therefore might allocate fewer ELTs 
127. For a description of alternative utilitarian allocation approaches, see G. WINSLOW, 
supra note 10 at 63-86. Depending on how the priorities are set, a very different group of patients 
would receive the ELTs, with different success rates. A shift in the priority for admission to the 
hospital intensive care unit from the "most critical" patients to the "most salvageable," for exam-
ple, reduced the mortality rate at one hospital intensive care unit in the 1960's from 80% to 20%, 
and at another hospital from 25-30% to 4-5%. See Note, supra note 11, at 655-56 & n.l88. 
128. For a discussion of comparing life-saving expenditures on the basis of the quality, 
and not merely the quantity, of life saved, see Zeckhauser & Shepard, Where Nowfor Saving Lives? 
40 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn, 1976, at 5, I l-!5. 
129. See Parsons and Lock, Triage and The P,uf,'ll/ H'ilh R,·11,J! Failure, 6 J. MED. ETHICS 
!73-76 ( 1980). One physician could not reject any of the patients on medical grounds and therefore 
did not complete the survey. !d. at !74. 
130. For a proposal of a limited set of such standards, see infra notes 257-78 and accom-
panying text. 
13!. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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to the poor, the elderly and the mentally and physically handi-
capped.132 While physicians might rationalize that their preferences are 
based on medical prognoses, they also are likely to reflect implicit-and 
r•:r-11'! r,; ~·,~·i:~lly L'rucccpt:1hlc-a~sumptions about relative social 
worth. 133 
4. EGALITARIAN APPROACHES 
In contrast to the foregoing approaches, which compare patients 
on the basis of social worth, wealth or medical criteria, ELTs might be 
allocated instead on the basis of chance. The major premise underlying 
this approach is that, in terms of being entitled to receive an ELT, all 
persons should be regarded as equal. Hence this position is termed 
"egalitarian." 
A number of justifications have been offered in support of an egali-
tarian philosophy for allocating ELTs. Foremost is the notion that pro-
viding equal opportunity among contenders for ELTs preserves indi-
vidual human dignity. 134 The egalitarian view is defended further on 
the grounds that it: I) avoids the practical and ethical problems created 
by selecting patients according to social worth; 135 2) prevents "favorit-
ism, bias and influence"/ 36 3) avoids the need for someone to make 
!d. 
132. In connection with allocating intensive care, see Mulley, supra note 7, at 306: 
[W]e are led to the conclusion that physicians do discriminate in allocating intensive care 
resources. It appears that fewer resources are expended on the elderly, those with poorer 
prognoses, those with impaired functional status (particularly intellectual impairment), 
and those unable to fulfill their social roles. More resources are expended on those with a 
high probability of regaining full functional status and contributing to society. 
133. Mindful of this danger, some commentators opposed to social worth allocation 
would attempt to place various limits on physician discretion. See. e.g., VALUING LIFE, supra note 
45, at 208 ("Psychological and environmental factors should be kept to an absolute minimum and 
should be considered only when they are without doubt critically related to medical acceptability 
(e.g., the emotional inability to cope with the rigors of dialysis which might lead to suicide)"); 
Katz, Process Design for Selection of Hemodialysis and Organ Transplant Recipients, 22 BUFFALO 
L. REv. 373, 392-415 (1973) (medical judgments must exclude consideration of race, sex, socio-
economic status, number of dependents, occupation, intelligence and psychological condition be-
yond minimum levels, geographic location, and age, if under 60). 
134. See. e.g .. G. WINSLOW, supra note 10, at 102; VALUING LIFE, supra note 45, at 212; 
Willard, supra note 53, at 225-26; see generally Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 92. Calabresi 
and Bobbitt, however, object to random allocation by lot on the basis that it is dehumanizing. G. 
CALABRESI & P. Bossrrr, supra note 53, at 134. ("The arbitrariness of the approach makes the 
losers feel helpless and depersonalized. The chance that lotteries give is a computer chance, not a 
human one.") 
135. See Willard, supra note 53, at 225-26; see also supra notes 88-1 10 and accompanying 
text. 
136. Willard, supra note 53, at 225-26. 
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difficult life-and-death choices; 13 7 4) promotes physician-patient 
trust/ 38 5) reduces the anxiety and stress of the patient and of those 
close to him; 139 6) avoids the destructive psychological effect of being 
rejected under a social worth approach; 140 and finally 7) helps reduce 
the need for rationing since the wealthy and powerful might make addi-
tional resources available to lower the risk of not being selected. 141 
· Two allocation methods are advocated under the egalitarian ap-
proach: random allocation, such as by lottery, and first-come, first-
served allocation. 
a. Random allocation 
One egalitarian method of allocating ELTs is to select patients at 
random, such as by drawing lots or by programming a computer to 
choose patients on a blind basis. 142 Selection by chance is a classic solu-
tion to the problems of distributive justice. For example, in an early 
case addressing the analogous issue of how to choose which persons to 
jettison from an overcrowded life boat, U.S. v. Holmes, 143 the circuit 
court recommended drawing lots as the fairest method. 144 The Second 
and Fifth Circuits also have approved choice by lot as a constitutionally 
permissible method for allocating scarce public housing and liquor 
licenses. 145 
137. !d. See also Glover, Causing Deaths and Saving Lives, in VALUING LIFE, supra note 
45, at 249-50. 
138. See Willard, supra note 53, at 225-26. 
139. !d. 
140. See Glover, supra note 137, at 259-60. 
141. See Willard, supra note 53, at 225-26. 
142. One commentator recommends that a series of lotteries be used, each one narrowing 
the pool of potential recipients. See Katz, supra note 133, at 394-415. He proposes that lotteries be 
used in combination with patient selection based on limited medical criteria. !d. 
143. 26 F. Cas. 360 (E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383). 
144. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 367 ("[W]e can conceive of no mode so consonant both to 
humanity and to justice; and the occasion, we think, must be peculiar which will dispense with its 
exercise"). The Holmes case involved a seaman who threw passengers from a sinking longboat 
after their ship sunk. All non-crew male passengers in the longboat except two married men and 
one boy were drowned; however, all nine crewmen in the boat survived, including the dcfcnd:1nt, 
who later was arrested and ch~rred with rn:ln~~Llll£h1er. T~:f' ;n.--'~,_, i:~<"lrll,~~·"',i th" .~1~::>' JT.,~t 11--r· 
~-:lik~rs \','t'rc \\Tt•ng in ~:lcriflcing p::~:~~L'!l~t~r:.;· :;-,L''. 11. i :r ... ~-
victed and sentenced to serve six months in prison and pay a $20 fine, which Ia ter was remitted. 
Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 369. The Holmes case raises the issue of whether a person may save his own 
life at the expense of another's, a question discussed infra in note 157. 
145. See Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262,265 (2d Cir. 1968) (hous-
ing); Hornsby v. Allen, 330 F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1964) (liquor licenses). These cases also held that 
allocation on a first-come, first-served basis met due process requirements. See Holmes, 398 F.2d at 
265; Hornsby, 330 F.2d at 56. For a discussion of the analogy between allocating ELTs and distrib-
uting licenses and welfare, see Katz, supra note 133, at 377. 
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b. FIFO 
Another egalitarian method of allocating ELTs is to give the re-
source to patients on a first-come, first-serve basis, or "FIFO," after the 
',tl .: 
1 
-[ ,_ r:· --~t-out." 146 In o r \\'ords. th::: fi;·st 
'i 
longest time for it. 
Some prefer FIFO over random allocation because it more closely 
resembles the practice generally used by hospitals and health care pro-
fessionals to allocate scarce resources. 14 7 FIFO also is recommended 
on the ground that it lets the patient know more clearly the chances of 
getting the treatment. Under a FIFO system, the patient can be told 
immediately, for example, that he is tenth in line for a resource, whereas 
under a random allocation system the patient only would be able to 
calculate the odds of getting the treatment when the size of the patient 
pool had been established and the drawing was about to take place. 148 
146. FIFO is an accounting principle that values inventory on the basis that the oldest 
remaining items are the first to be sold. Thus, the cost of the newest remaining items of stock-would 
be used to calculate inventory value. See H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRlNCIPLES OF AccOUNTING 
192-93 (1963). 
147. See Note, supra note 29, at 1341. FIFO is preferred over random allocation by the 
author of the 1969 Columbia Law Review note, but the author gives no reasons for this preference. 
See Note, supra note II, at 662-63. Apparently, the federal government has determined that hospi-
tals operating under the "Hill-Burton" program may use FIFO allocation. See 42 C.F.R. 
§ l24.507(b) (1984) ("If the facility fails to adopt and publish a plan [for allocating care to indi-
gents], it will be presumed to have adopted a plan under which it provides all services of the facility 
without charge to all persons unable to pay who first request such services, until its annual compli-
ance level has been met for the fiscal year"). 
FIFO is one of the principal rationing systems used by the British National Health Service. 
See Schwartz & Aaron, supra note 54, at 52-56. (The authors describe the historical and cultural 
differences between Britain and the United States that make acceptance of the British system un-
likely in this country.) See also H. AARON & W. ScHWARTZ, supra note 9, at ll3-35. 
148. See Note, supra note 29, at 1342 (FIFO "seems salutary in enabling a sick person to 
estimate immediately his chances of selection, so that he can try to find an opening elsewhere if he 
probably will not be taken"). Note that the FIFO principle would operate even under a random 
allocation system, if a patient who is selected to receive the ELT is not at risk of being displaced by 
someone chosen in a later lottery. In other words, patients selected in earlier lotteries would be 
"first-come" in relation to patients in later lotteries. See VALUING LIFE, supra note 45, at 217. For a 
discussion of the displacement or "unplugging" issue, see infra notes 198-200 and accompanying 
text. 
One commentator claims that FIFO is preferable to random allocation because it avoids the 
delay required to assemble a pool of patients from which to select those who receive the resource. 
See Willard, supra note 53, at 226. But except when a pool is first assembled, this delay could be 
avoided under a random allocation system by holding the selection whenever a resource became 
available, with the pool comprised of whichever patients were waiting for the resource at the time. 
Willard prefers FIFO over random allocation on the additional ground that FIFO is a 
process of "natural" as opposed to "artificial" chance. I d. He also argues that random allocation 
creates a risk that the process will be rigged to favor a particular patient. (For example, under a 
supposedly random computer procedure, a computer operator might be bribed to program the 
computer to select a particular patient.) !d. at 227. But there seems to be a similar risk with a FIFO 
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On the other hand, random allocation may be preferable to FIFO 
from a purely egalitarian standpoint. FIFO's preference for the first-
come would tend to favor patients who obtained prompt medical atten-
tion, accurate diagnoses, referrals to the necessary specialists, and the 
like. These patients probably would be better off than those who 
showed up later in line. 149 
Regardless of whether random allocation or FIFO were used, the 
egalitarian approach is vulnerable to challenge on the ground that its 
basic premise-that all persons are equally entitled to ELTs-is unten-
able. First, even those who favor an egalitarian approach probably 
would concede that only those persons who were medically suited to 
receive the EL T should be eligible. 150 But then some patients have 
much better prognoses than others; compare for example, an otherwise 
healthy 25-year old candidate for hemodialysis with a 75-year old ter-
minal cancer patient who also is a candidate for hemodialysis. It is 
questionable whether these two patients are equally entitled to the 
ELT. 151 Second, suppose that an egalitarian approach is employed 
only after patients have been screened on the basis of medical criteria. A 
host of additional allocation questions must now be addressed. Should 
the patients also be differentiated according to some system of medical 
priorities 152 and, if so, how should those priorities be established? For 
example, should patients be placed nearer the head of the line depend-
ing on the severity of their condition, or depending on whether they are 
most easily saved by treatment? 153 Should the objective be to save the 
most lives, the most number of years of life (an approach favoring the 
system; hospital employees might be induced to change the dates on hospital records to create a 
false priority for a particular patient. Willard also supports his preference for FIFO on the basis 
that random selection rewards vice by occasionally selecting a "bearer of socially disvalued quali· 
ties" to receive an ELT. !d. at 228. However, this also seems to be a problem with FIFO. For a 
discussion of the selection ofnondeserving individuals through an egalitarian allocation approach, 
see infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
149. On the premise that the poor often lack primary care physicians and go straight to 
the hospital for their basic medical needs, however, they might garner an earlier position in line 
than more wealthy patients by avoiding the time it takes to be referred from primary care physi-
cian to specialist to hospital. 
1::!\_ C",,.' '1'. Tl:::T,-·•'!''l•·'!'','T• ;-/\f!TJI.Irl•.t~JTr•PT_ "1.'f'I''J;:r·jr>'1J.~Jj 1:1:?--13 
l .;';:- l !. 1 ·- .! 
133, at 392-415; VALUING LiFE, supra note 45, at2U7. 
· 151. See Childress, supra note 10, at 557 (allocation of intensive care to reonates "by 
randomization or queuing unless there are major differences in their probabilities of survival"). 
For a poignant discussion of the doctor's dilemma in expending scarce medical resources on the 
terminally ill, see Hilfiker, Allowing the Debilitated to Die: Facing Our Ethical Choices, 308 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 716-19 (1983). 
152. Such an approach could not be employed with a random allocation system unless a 
hierarchy of patient selection pools were formed corresponding to different levels of medical 
necessity. 
153. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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young), or the best quality oflife (an approach that might favor, among 
others, those without handicaps or other medical debilities)?154 Fi-
nally, if patients are supposed to be equally entitled to the ELT except 
for medically-related differences, how great is the danger that medical 
j :~::l;C:Jt; \\·illlk;:;ui,:~ s._,_·i:d 1.~>1Lh distinctions to be.: avcrL::d?tss 
Even aside frorn medical distinctions among patients, it is difficult 
to accept the proposition that all persons are entitled equally to ELTs. 
Consider for example the following candidates: 
1) The President of the United States in time of war; 
2) A brilliant cancer researcher; 
3) A convicted child rapist/killer awaiting execution; 
4) A widow with ten children; 
5) An unmarried, childless person; 
6) A life-long heavy cigarette smoker who seeks treatment of lung 
cancer with a scarce cancer drug capable of treating other types of 
cancer; 
7) A wealthy philanthropist willing, if given the ELT, to donate 
enough money to make one, ten, or a hundred more ELTs available; 
and 
8) A wealthy philanthropist who already has donated enough 
money to make one, ten, or a hundred EL Ts available. 
A truly egalitarian allocation system would make no distinction 
among the persons on this list. In a lottery drawing, the President or a 
brilliant medical researcher would stand no better chance of being se-
lected than anyone else, and a child rapist no less a chance of being 
selected. The fact that the child rapist was on death row would not 
affect his standing, presumably even if his execution were imminent. 156 
Although the death of a single parent would deprive his or her children 
of parental care and support, this would not give the parent a prefer-
ence over a single, childless person. A philanthropist's offer to make 
additional ELTs available to save others would not give him selection 
priority, although if he already had consummated his pledge, he may 
have improved his odds because there would be more ELTs to be allo-
cated among the same number of patients. The allocation system also 
would not distinguish between a patient who sought treatment for a 
154. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
155. For an elaborate plan for reducing social worth bias in an EL T allocation scheme 
based on medical and egalitarian selection processes, see Katz, supra note 133, at 392-415. 
156. See, e.g., lnma/e Refuses Surgery, Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1983, at B7, col. 5 (man, sen-
tenced to die in electric chair for fatally beating elderly woman, refuses triple-bypass heart surgery 
a second time after it was recommended by doctors). In fact, under current constitutional interpre-
tations, prison inmates are more entitled to EL Ts than law-abiding citizens, since failure to receive 
the ELT would be regarded as unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
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condition that he was in some sense responsible for, such as drug addic-
tion or lung cancer caused by smoking, and a patient in need of treat-
ment for a more involuntary affliction. 
These and similar examples profoundly challenge the assumptions 
underlying a truly egalitarian system of allocating ELTs. At the least, 
the examples suggest that some outcomes of this system would be high-
ly unacceptable to society. 157 
Recognizing that a pure egalitarian allocation system could yield 
undesirable results in extreme cases, commentators who nonetheless 
favor the overall approach attempt to avoid the more extreme cases 
that might arise. Most would make an exception, for example, for a 
head of state, 158 although several suggest that this would only be called 
for in wartime. 159 One commentator acknowledges the need to avoid 
the extreme cases, but admits that he knows of no practical method for 
doing so. 160 Still another would permit exceptions, but only if they 
were so compelling that we would be willing to take resources away 
from persons who already had received them, such as disconnecting 
someone's artificial heart. 161 It is noteworthy that the exceptions dis-
cussed in the literature all are aimed at assuring that exceptionally im-
157. One commentator states that egalitarian allocation "would reward socially disval-
ued qualities by giving their bearers the same special medical care opportunities as those received 
by the bearer of socially valued qualities." Shatin, supra note 90, at I 00. 
Additional problems would arise if the pool of potential ELT recipients included the person 
making the allocation decision. Cf. Annas, Allocation of Artificial Hearts in the Year 2002: 
Minerva v. National Health Agency, 3 AM. J. L. & MED. 59 (1977) (hypothetical Supreme Court 
decision upholding regulations for allocating artificial hearts, in which the five justices in majority 
had all received artificial hearts under the allocation regulations). This topic is related to the issue 
of justification: whether another's life may be taken to save one's own. See, e.g., Regina v. Dudley 
& Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (upholding jury conviction of three crewmen in lifeboat who 
killed and ate fourth crewman, a sick boy, to avoid ~tarvation; the Crown commuted the death 
sentence to six months imprisonment); U.S. v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 
15,383) (crewman convicted of manslaughter for throwing male passengers overboard to prevent 
lifeboat from floundering); Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. REv. 616-45 
(1949) (opinion in hypothetical case of explorers who, to save themselves, kill and e3t one of their 
number, chosen by lot but unwilling to die). Fn 3 discm,ci,cn nf the rclc\·:•nce ,cf jtJc·tiG,·:lli••n In 
allocating ELTs, see Note, supra note II, at627-2S. 
!58. See, e.g., G. WINSLOW, supra note 10, at 77-78. Winslow states that an exception for 
the President of the United States might be justified under the utilitarian principle of enabling a 
person to fulfill his responsibilities to dependents. /d. On this basis, however, an exception would 
presumably be in order for all family breadwinners, as well as for the single parent in the textual 
example; Note, supra note I I, at 663. 
159. See, e.g., VALUING LIFE, supra note 45, at 217-18; Glover, supra note 137, at 252-53. 
Glover uses the example of Churchill in 1940, implying that an exception for the head of state in 
war lime should be made only when it appears that the war is being lost. 
160. See Glover, szipra note 137, at 254. 
161. See VALUING LIFE, supra note 45, at 217-18. This position conflicts with the assump-
tion that a patient will not be forced to forfeit an ELT once it has been allocated to him. See, e.g., 
G. WINSLOW, supra note 10, at 147; infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text. 
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portant persons receive an ELT rather than basing allocation strictly on 
chance or FIFO; they do not address the other extreme in which one 
might want to assure, for example, that a child rapist did not receive the 
resource over more deserving persons. 
T:: c,,,,. c':~·,r_ n·:::-~ Jl1S t::-> c:_r;:t]itari:ln allocation are permit-
ted, it is cliil!cult to draw the line at ju3t the extreme cases. It may be 
imperative to allocate an ELT to the President of the United States in a 
wartime crisis, but then it may also be important to allocate ELTs to 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to scientists working on critical war projects 
(such as the atomic bomb during World War II), to talented field com-
manders, and so on. From this perspective, the distinctions between the 
President and the average man that appear to justify a preference for 
the President in an otherwise egalitarian system resolve themselves into 
differences of degree rather than kind; the President may be more wor-
thy of the EL T than anyone else, but then the Joint Chiefs of Staff are 
more worthy than anyone else besides the President, and so on down 
the line past the brilliant cancer researchers to the child rapists. In 
short, once the principle is accepted that there should be differences in 
the degree of entitlement to ELTs, the system becomes one based on 
social utility comparisons, with all of the drawbacks discussed ear-
lier. 162 However, the alternative of a strict egalitarian approach seems 
equally untenable. 163 
5. "ARESPONSIBLE" ALLOCATION 
Instead of focusing on the outcome of rationing decisions, some 
commentators emphasize the process by which rationing decisions 
I 62. See supra notes 88- I I 0 and accompanying text. 
163. To avoid the deaths of persons generally agreed to be worth saving, one alternative 
might be to allocate a certain number of EL Ts in an egalitarian fashion, but allow those who were 
not selected in the initial allocation to compete for additional ELTs. All persons would have the 
same initial opportunity to obtain the resource through the egalitarian allocation process; presum-
ably persons with high social utility qualifications would be allocated the additional resources, 
while those with negative qualifications would be allowed to die. One method of effectuating this 
approach would be through a modified market mechanism; a certain number of EL Ts would be 
allocated randomly or on the FIFO principle, while others could be purchased by the wealthy and 
those who, by virtue of their social utility appeal, could raise enough money through friends, 
relatives and charity. Another method would resemble the hotel practice of saving a few rooms for 
unexpected V.I.P.'s: the bulk of available EL Ts would be allocated on an egalitarian basis, while a 
few could be reserved for particularly worthy individuals. The former alternative has the draw-
backs of wealth-based allocation. See supra notes 111-22 and accompanying text. The latter raises 
the question of whether to allow EL Ts to go unused if somebody especially worthwhile fails to 
turn up, while other patients die. It also presents the problems of how to choose who gets the V.I.P. 
resources, problems similar to those created by social utility allocation. Both alternatives also 
share the deficiency that highly undesirable individuals may be chosen to receive the EL T in the 
initial random drawing. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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should be made. One such viewpoint recommends that the allocation 
process be concealed from public view. On the principle of "do it but 
don't tell us," ELTs would be allocated inconspicuously by private 
rather than by public decision-making. 164 In its most extreme form, 
selection standards would be unarticulated; no explanation of reasons 
would be announced; and the decision-makers would be publicly unac-
countable for their actions-hence the term "aresponsible 
allocation." 165 
In particular, government involvement would be avoided. In the 
absence of state action, allocation largely would be exempt from due 
process and equal protection requirements. 166 This would remove 
much of the allocation process from judicial scrutiny. 167 
The lack of government involvement in EL T allocation, It IS ar-
gued, would help preserve the notion of the sanctity of human life: 
"There is the spectacle of government (under judicial mandate, no less) 
openly renouncing the widely held belief in the sanctity of human life, 
acknowledging for all to see that society is unwilling to expend the 
funds necessary to obviate the scarcity that causes the allocative prob-
lem."168 By maintaining the fiction that life is sacrosanct whatever the 
cost, aresponsible allocation also might reduce pressures on society to 
"overspend" on ELTs: "The possible result [of public allocation] would 
be a subtle form of institutional blackmail, inducing society to spend 
more resources in this area than it might otherwise choose." 169 
164. See Blumstein, supra note llO, at 1400; Havighurst, supra note 31, at 142-45. 
Blumstein's article addresses rationing of all medical care, rather than ELTs in particular. 
165. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 53, at 57; Havighurst, supra note 31, at 
!57 ("Not only would [a requirement of standards and stated findings] gravely interfere with medi-
cal practice, but it would also require both explicit ordering of sensitive priorities and overt inter-
personal comparisons, which are bound to have significant demoralizing effects in an egalitarian 
democratic society" (footnote omitted)). Calabresi and Bobbitt discuss the advisability of having 
EL Ts and similar allocation decisions, which they term "tragic choices," made by unaccountable 
decision-making bodies resembling juries. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra, at 53-79. But 
potential jurors are examined and may be challenged before trial to a void bias, see, e.g., 28 U .S.C. 
§ 1870 (1982); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24; the standards for juries to apply in reaching a verdict are 
carefully articulated through judges' instructions, see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 51; FED. R. CRIM. P. 30; 
and their decisions are subject to preemption and reversal by the courts, see, e.g., FED. R. C!v. P. 
50 (directed verdicts); FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 (judgments of acquittal); FED. R. C!v. P. 50 (judgments 
notwithstanding the verdict) and to appellate rc\'icw. 
166. For the discussion of state action, see supra note II 0. 
167. One commentator argues that adequate judicial supervision of private allocation 
processer can be accomplished through malpractice actions. See Blumstein, supra note 110, at 
1395-99. For a discussion of the role of malpractice in allocating ELTs, see infra notes 203,210-14, 
218-35 and accompanying text. 
168. Blumstein, supra note 24, at 250. See Havighurst, supra note 31, at 156. 
169. Blumstein, supra note 24, at 252. The possibility that public, collective decision-mak-
ing might make society aware of the need for additional lifesaving medical resources is cited by one 
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The aresponsible approach has drawn harsh criticism. 170 This crit-
icism has not focused so much on whether allocation should be by gov-
ernmental or private bodies; there may well be sound reasons for per-
mitting allocation decisions to be made by private bodies. Rather, the 
criticism aims at the thesis that these decisions should be shielded from 
scrutiny and review. As the critics point out, this thesis cuts against the 
fundamental principle that important-let alone life-and-death-deci-
sions should be made in a publicly accountable manner. 171 It invites 
abuse of discretion by decision-makers. 172 The lack of accountability 
and the appearance of bias, it will be recalled, in large part prompted 
the public outcry against the allocation of hemodialysis machines by 
aresponsible bodies in the 1960's. 173 The hemodialysis experience also 
illustrates the naive assumption that EL T rationing can long remain 
hidden from the public eye. 
Nor would aresponsible rationing necessarily reduce rationing 
costs. First, it would not convert identifiable patient lives to "cheaper" 
statistical lives, because the lives at stake would remain ideritifiable. 174 
Second, aresponsible decision-making would concentrate the burden of 
the costs of rationing on a small group of decision-makers, such as the 
physicians or hospital committees, rather than permitting some of the 
responsibility, and hence the administrative costs, to be shared by 
others, such as judges or lawmakers. 
Moreover, unless a number of well-established programs were dis-
mantled, EL Ts will continue to be allocated at least to some extent by 
governmental entities such as public or Veterans Administration hospi-
tals, or according to Medicare and Medicaid regulations. And in these 
circumstances, aresponsible decision-making may be prohibited by law. 
First, it might violate the Administrative Procedure Act's provisions 
against arbitrary and capricious agency action. 175 Second, and more 
generally, it might contravene the constitutional guarantee of due pro-
set of authors as an argument against aresponsible decision-making. See J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, 
supra note 22, at 195. 
170. See J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, supra note 22; Note, supra note 29, at 1336 ("Anonymous 
committee decisions ... are intolerable"); Note, Due Process in !he A/local ion of Scarce Lifesav-
ing Medical Resources, 84 YALE L. J. 1734-49 (1975) (attributed in Fox & Swazey, supra note 13, at 
352-53, to Judge A. Leon Higgenbotham, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit). 
171. See Note, supra note 29, at 1337. 
172. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 53, at 64. 
173. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text. 
175. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1977); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. 1178 
(1983). 
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cess, 176 although the Burger Court has narrowed the scope of this con-
stitutional protection considerably. 177 Finally, there is an unlawful 
breach of the health professional's duty to obtain the patient's in-
formed consent if the success of aresponsible allocation depends on 
176. See, e.g., Note, supra note 170, at 1736-39. The author of the note maintains that 
allocation by public hospitals, which at the time comprised 38% of all hospitals, and by private 
hospitals under some circumstances, constitutes state action such that allocation is subject to due 
process requirements. !d. While receipt of federal funds under Medicare, Medicaid or Hill-Burton 
programs would not necessarily make private hospitals subject to constitutional limitations, see 
supra cases discussed in notes 67-73 and accompanying text, decisions on which treatments should 
be reimbursed under Medicare and Medicaid. for example, must meet constitutional require-
ments, including due process. Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,469-70 (1977) ("The Constitution 
imposes no obligation on the States ... to pay ... any of the medical expenses of indigents. But 
when a State decides to alleviate some of the hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the 
manner in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limitations"); Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U .S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1976). 
177. See Blumstein, supra note 24, at 247. The fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit 
state action which deprives a person of life, liberty and property without due process of law. U.S. 
CoNST. amends. V, XIV,§ I. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972), the Supreme 
Court held that a constitutionally protected interest must be established before due process is 
required. Insofar as "life" is explicitly cited in the due process clauses, it would seem evident that 
deprivation of life by the state-including the denying of ELTs under a government program-
would be subject to due process constraints. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-12 (1976), how-
ever, th_~: Supreme Court held that only "liberty" or "property" interests that had been recognized 
by state law or guaranteed by explicit provisions of The Bill of Rights were entitled to constitu-
tional protection. More to the point, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, observed that an 
innocent bystander mistakenly shot or negligently run over by police, although deprived of life, 
would not necessarily have a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Paul, 424 U.S. at 698. How-
ever, Justice Brennan, in his dissent, argued that Justice Rehnquist's comment must be limited to 
the issue of whether the accidental death of the bystander is the result of action "under color of' 
state law, which is a prerequisite to suit under section 1983: "There is simply no way in which the 
Court ... could declare that the loss of a person's life is not an interest cognizable within the 'life' 
portion of the Due Process Clause." Paul, 424 U.S. at 716-17 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Justice Brennan's interpretation is somewhat supported by the Court's decision in Martinez 
v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980). This was an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a due 
process violation in the death of a woman who was murdered by a convict five months after he was 
paroled. The Court held that the connection between the parole board's release of the convict and 
the murder was too remote to constitute state action. Martinez, 444 U.S. at 284-85. But the Court 
did not question the proposition that the victim's life was a cognizable interest under the due 
process clauses. 
Insofar as Roth suggests that interests recognized by state law are entitled to due process 
protection, it is noteworthy that several federal and state laws arguably recognize and protect a 
person's interest in obtaining an ELT, at least in some situations. See supra notes 60-66, 71 and 
accompanying text. The Supreme Court abortion cases also implicitly recognize an interest in life. 
See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481,2491-92 (1983) ("[A] state 
has an 'important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life"'); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (same). However, the relevance of the abortion cases to ELT 
allocation problems is clouded by the competing interests of the mother, which are not necessarily 
"life" interests. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2492 ("[T]he State may proscribe abortions altogether, 
'except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother'") (emphasis added); Roe, 
410 U.S. at 163-64 (same). 
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concealing from patients the fact that an ELT is available but is being 
withheld. 178 
6. "DUE PROCESS" ALLOCATION 
In reaction to the foregoing problems, critics of aresponsible allo-
cation argue that a number of procedural protections must be provided 
to patients in need of ELTs, 179 including impartial decision-makers; 180 
some form of hearing; 181 representation of the patient/ 82 a record of 
the proceedings; 18 3 written findings 184 based on established criteria; 18 5 
and judicial review. 186 
This "due process" approach, however, also raises serious practi-
cal and ethical problems. The need to allocate some ELTs quickly, es-
pecially in emergency situations, would restrict the extent to which pro-
cedural safeguards could be provided. Hearings would have to be 
limited in scope and length, and administrative and judicial review of 
178. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 
(1972). The informed consent doctrine obligates the physician to inform his patient adequately 
concerning the patient's course of treatment. The issue of liability generally arises when patients 
complain that they were harmed as a result of receiving treatment that they did not consent to 
because of a lack of adequate information. However, the doctrine also covers harm resulting from 
failure to inform the patient that treatment was available and to explain the consequences of not 
being treated. As Judge Robinson stated in Canterbury: "The topics importantly demanding a 
communication of information are the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, 
the alternatives 10 thai treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated." !d. 
464 F.2d at 787-88 (emphasis added). In Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285,611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. 
Rptr. 308 (1980), for example, the California Supreme Court reversed a judgment in favor of a 
physician whose patient died of cervical cancer after not being given a pap smear. The court held 
that the physician failed to inform his patient of the risks of not being tested. !d. 27 Cal. 3d at 292-
93, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312. Of particular interest is the physician's testimony that 
the patient declined the pap smear because it was too costly for her. !d. 27 Cal. 3d at 290, 611 P.2d 
at 904, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 310. This suggests that cost considerations will not support a lack of 
informed consent. 
One of the consequences of not informing a patient that an EL T could save his life but was 
not being provided because of its cost is that the patient is precluded from seeking the ELT from 
another physician or hospital. This not only violates the informed consent doctrine but constitutes 
the intentional tort of abandonment. See, e.g., Spendlove v. Georges, 4 Utah 2d 392,295 P.2d 336 
(1956) (doctor liable for discharging patient prematurely without affording a reasonable opportu-
nity to obtain alternative care); Hall v. Nagel, 139 Ohio St. 265, 39 N.E.2d 612 (1942); Annat., 57 
A.L.R. 2d 432 (1958). 
179. See Katz, supra note 133, at 392-415; Note, supra note 29, at 1336-42; Note, supra 
note 170, at 1746-49. 
180. See Note, supra note 170, at 1747. 
181. See id. at 1746; Note, supra note 29, at 1337. 
182. See Note, supra note 170, at 1747-48; Note, supra note 29, at 1340. 
183. See Note, supra note 170, at 1748-49; Note, supra note 29, at 1337. 
184. See Note, supra note 170, at 1748-49; Note, supra note 29, at 1337. 
185. See Katz, supra note 133, at 392-415; Note, supra note 170, at 1747. 
186. See Katz, supra note 133, at 397-98; Note, supra note 29, at 1340-41. 
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individual cases could be afforded only if time permitted. 18 7 Moreover, 
the diversity of the cases (patients of different ages, patients with differ-
ent coexisting medical problems, patients seeking temporary relief ver-
sus an indefinite cure, etc.) might demand such expansive decision-mak-
ing flexibility that it would be impossible to articulate or adhere to any 
meaningful pre-established allocation criteria. 188 
An additional disadvantage with due process allocation is open 
competition among the patients. 189 Confrontation of adversaries is a 
hallmark of due process, 190 so that it might be expected that patients 
competing for the same resource would encounter one another and that 
the patients' legal representatives would have the right to cross-examine 
each other's witnesses. Because the patients would experience consider-
able stress and anxiety as a result of this process, these due process pro-
cedures probably would not be followed in the ELT context. 191 Yet 
even under a modified adversarial process-such as one in which the 
decision-makers performed the role of devil's advocate_:_the stakes 
would be so high that bitter, destructive and prolonged proceedings 
could be expected. 192 
Finally, any procedure that permitted patients to be assisted or 
represented by others would favor the wealthy, who could afford to hire 
top counsel and to spend substantial sums on preparing their argu-
- 187. Recognizing the need for speedy decisions, some advocates of due process allocation 
admit that hearings should not be "unduly protracted," Note, supra note 170, at 1746, and that 
judicial review may not be available at all, see Note, supra note 29, at 1341. Time limits alone 
probably would make the elaborate decision-making process advocated by Katz, with administra-
tive and judicial review at several stages, unworkable. See Katz, supra note 133, at 397-98. 
188. One commentator, conceding that allocators would need substantial discretion in 
selecting allocation criteria, would allow decision-makers to ignore established criteria but would 
require a written explanation of any decision not made under the established criteria. Note, supra 
note 170, at 1747. 
189. One set of commentators states that competition among patients would amount to 
"legalistic indecency." Havighurst, supra note 31, at 157. 
190. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970); Greene v. McElroy, 
360 U.S. 474,496-99 (1959). 
191. See Note, supra note 170, at 1746 (to reduce anxiety, opportunity to confront wit-
nesses should be afforded only at the discretion of decision-makers). While an opportunity to 
confront and to cross-examine witnesses is a traditional aspect of procedural due process, the 
Supreme Court has stated that due process requirements must remain flexible. See Greenholtz v. 
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. l, 13 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,334-35 (1976). 
Accordingly, limitations on the opportunity to confront witnesses would not necessarily be uncon-
stitutional. Privacy considerations might also preclude such confrontations. See Note, supra note 
170, at 1746-47 (hearings should be closed to protect privacy); cf Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 
870 (Iowa 1983) (revealing identity of unwilling bone marrow transplant donor to attorney for 
leukemia victim or to court would violate unwilling donor's right to privacy). 
192. One commentator suggests that the hearing process could be collegial, with the pa-
tient's representative bound to disclose facts unfavorable to the patient. See Note, supra note 170, 
at 1748 n.69. 
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ments. 193 To avoid this, patients instead might be denied representa-
tion, but they then would be forced to participate personally in the allo-
cation proceedings or forego any opportunity to present their case. And 
as noted, direct involvement by the patients would be extremely stress-
ful, in addition to being unfair to those who were too ill to participate 
effectively. 
Accepting the foregoing objections, the advocates of the due pro-
cess approach propose severe limitations on customary due process 
safeguards. The major proponent of due process in ELT allocation, for 
example, recommends that the decision-makers be given discretion to 
limit the length and scope of the hearing; require the patient to be repre-
sented by a non-legal advocate such as a social worker; preclude con-
frontation of witnesses; close the proceedings; and reach decisions with-
out prior decision-making guidelines, so long as the actual basis of the 
decision is disclosed. Furthermore, judicial review would not necessar-
ily be available. 194 
These limitations might well give no more than an illusion of due 
process to arbitrary decision-making. More importantly, they reduce 
the ability of the rationing mechanism to legitimize the rationing out-
come. Less-than-full procedural safeguards may suffice for some public 
decision-making195 but, as demonstrated by capital punishment and 
euthanasia cases, 196 they are inadequate when it comes to decisions to 
cause or to allow preventable death. Finally, regardless of how com-
plete the procedural protections afforded patients are, due process is 
only process; the choice of patients to receive treatment still must be 
based on some substantive criterion. If this criterion is not inherently 
fair, its implementation through "fair" procedures will not make it so. 
7. NONALLOCATION 
One further alternative might be to give EL Ts to no one. The ratio-
nale would be that, if all cannot have them, and there is no satisfactory 
method of deciding who should have them, no one should have them. 
At first, the adoption of this proposal might seem unthinkable, since it 
193. See the discussion of wealth-based ELT allocation supra notes lll-22 and accompa-
nying text. 
194. See Note, supra note 170, at 1746-49. 
195. See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L REv. 1267 (1975). 
196. "The Court ... has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other 
punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing deter-
mination. In ensuring that the death penalty is not meted out arbitrarily or capriciously, the 
Court's principal concern has been ... with the procedure by which the State imposes the death 
sentence .... "California v. Ramos, 103 S.Ct. 3446,3451 (!983) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in 
original). On euthanasia, see cases cited supra note 43. 
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entails a deliberate decision to abandon lives that could be saved. But 
this alternative actually was adopted by at least one hospital during the 
hemodialysis crisis of the 1960s: unable to provide free treatments to all 
in need, it discontinued its dialysis program rather than treat only those 
able to pay. 197 The extreme action taken by this hospital reflects at least 
in part the harsh implications of rationing-in this case rationing on the 
basis of price-for health care providers. 
8. UNPLUGGING 
A final predicament would accompany any allocation system 
based on patient comparisons: If the ELT were one that the patient had 
to be maintained on to survive-such as an artificial heart--could it be 
taken away from one patient and given to a later-arriving patient who 
scored higher on the relevant comparative scales?198 Under a social 
utility approach based on past performance, for example, 199 a patient 
who received an ELT because he once risked his life to save another's 
might be subject to displacement by a patient who had saved a dozen 
lives. Similarly, in a system based on future performance, a person who 
later committed a crime, or a President defeated in the next election, 
might be deemed to forfeit the EL T. And in a system based on medical 
197. See Note, supra note II, at 653. The 1980 decision by the trustees of the Massachu-
setts General Hospital not to initiate a program to perform six heart transplants a year represents 
another instance of a nonallocation approach. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The 
trustees' decision was based on the cost of the procedure and on the recognition that six trans-
plants a year would not have any real impact on the problem of heart disease. Leaf, supra note 20, 
at 1087-88. 
A non-allocation approach has been advanced by Cahn to deal with the lifeboat-type situa-
tion in which some people must be thrown overboard or the boat will capsize and all will drown. 
His theory is that no one should be chosen to live or die, even if this means that all die. See E. 
CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 71 (1955). The lifeboat situation differs from the problem of allocat-
ing ELTs in important respects, however. First, it presents an example of "technological" rather 
than "economic" scarcity; no amount of funds will increase the seaworthiness of the boat. Second, 
since the survivors presumably would have to kill to save themselves, they would be engaging in an 
act of commission rather than an act of omission. Rationing ELTs more closely resembles an act 
of omission, because the lack of medical intervention permits the patient's disease to result in 
death (although a rationing scheme in which patients could be taken off of a life-sustaining re-
source, for example if they committed a crime or if a more deserving candidate appeared, would 
entail acts of commission; see infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text). For a discussion of 
omission versus commission in the context of allocating ELT's, see Note, supra note I i, at 625-n. 
Cahn does not actually intend that all in the lifeboat should die; rather, he hopes that vol'.!r:-
teers will throw themselves overboard so that the others may live. See E. C..u!N, supra, at 71. In this 
way, those on the lifeboat would avoid having to kill, and the volunteers would be ennobled. But 
Cahn's model has the paradoxical result that those morally most worthy of living-the selfless 
volunteers-would inevitably die, either by suicide or by drowning with the others. 
198. See VALUING LIFE, supra note 45, at 217-18 (patient on life-sustaining ELT subject to 
replacement by President in time of war). 
199. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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judgment, the EL T might be switched from one patient to another who 
was medically more qualified (e.g., had a better long-term prognosis). 
Nothing inherent in the allocation approaches seems to preclude "un-
plugging;" yc:t it raises a number of difficult legal and ethical 
questions. 200 
III. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO ELT RATIONING 
As described in Section I, any method for rationing ELTs would 
possess such formidable shortcomings that it is at least questionable 
that the costs of rationing could be decreased below the cost of provid-
ing treatment to all in need. Nevertheless, cost containment concerns 
may lead to attempts to ration. In a number of circumstances, these 
efforts can be expected to be challenged in the courts. The following 
discussion therefore will explore the contexts in which litigation over 
cost-based rationing might arise, and will provide guidelines for judicial 
decision-making. 
Initially, however, the thesis that judicial involvement in EL T ra-
tioning is likely to occur might be questioned because no known law-
suits were brought in connection with the rationing of dialysis treat-
ments in the 1960's and early 1970's. It could have been expected that at 
least some ELT litigation would have occurred, as it is generally ac-
cepted that a large number of patients died as a result of not receiving 
treatment. 201 
Several factors, however, explain the lack of rationing cases during 
the dialysis crisis. First, patients or their survivors might not have been 
in a position to sue. Patients denied treatment tended to be older, 
poorer, less powerful and less well-educated than those who were dia-
lyzed. 202 Therefore, they were less likely to be aware of legal remedies, 
and less able to pursue them. In regard to the absence of malpractice 
suits, for instance, the poor seldom pursue malpractice remedies be-
cause the bar is reluctant to represent them due to the small size of their 
recoveries (in terms of lost earning capacity); because under state wel-
fare laws, welfare recipients must turn over their recoveries to the state; 
and because the poor may have lower expectations of what constitutes 
200. See G. WINSLOW, supra note 10, at 149 ("Once treatment had begun, legitimate ex-
pectations would be established, and no one would advocate hav.ing an artificial heart recipient 
enter each new lottery to see if the device should be retained or relinquished"). See also Note, supra 
note II, at 624-27 (discussing whether replacing patient on ELT is murder). 
20 I. See supra note 38. --
202. See supra notes 106, 118 and accompanying text. See generally SECURING AccESs TO 
HEALTH CARE, supra note l, at 59-113. 
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proper medical care. 203 Indeed, many who died from the lack of dialy-
sis treatment probably did not receive any basic medical care and there-
fore never reached the point where they actually were rejected for 
dialysis. 204 
Second, and no doubt in part because of their lack of education, 
patients denied dialysis for reasons of cost simply may have been una-
ware that their lives might have been saved. For example, they may not 
have known that dialysis existed, or they may have been given the mis-
impression that there were overriding medical reasons for not being 
given treatment. 205 
Finally, assuming that well-informed patients actually investigated 
the possibility of suit, they may have been discouraged by the novelty of 
their legal argument and by the lack of favorable judicial precedents. 
During much of the dialysis crisis many physicians regarded the dialy-
sis technique as experimentaJ.2°6 Patients may have been counselled 
against bringing suit on the grounds that the courts were unlikely to 
regard dialysis as an established therapeutic procedure, and that judges 
were virtually certain to hold that a patient was not entitled by law to an 
experimental treatment. 207 Prospective plaintiffs also may have been 
deterred by cases holding that physicians208 and hospitals209 were 
under no absolute duty to provide treatment to all in need. 
While the victims of modem EL T rationing are likely to resemble 
those who were denied dialysis thirty years ago, and therefore are likely 
to be poorly situated to sue, the circumstances that would surround 
widespread ELT rationing today are significantly different. Recent 
trends in malpractice liability improve the chances of an outcome in the 
203. See Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TEx. 
L. REv. 1401, 1411-16 (1981). 
204. See generally SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTII CARE, supra note 1, at 59-118. 
205. Physicians in the United Kingdom, where the National Health Service rations EL Ts, 
are reported to tell patients that there is nothing that can be done for them medically when they are 
in fact unlikely to receive treatment primarily because of cost. See H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, 
supra "note 9, at 101. This practice arguably would violate informed consent requirements in the 
United States, see supra note 178 and accompanying text, but might be difficult to detect. 
206. See supra note 38. 
207. Cf United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (terminal cancer patients not 
entitled to treatment with unapproved drug Laetrile); Hall v. Ferry, 235 F. Supp. 821, 826-27 
(E.D. Va. 1964) (physician must adopt "those techniques which have become standard in his line 
of practice"); Emory Univ. v. Porter, 103 Ga. App. 752, 120 S.E.2d 668 (1961) (hospit:~l not liaL!e 
for failing to provide the latest improvements or inventions). 
208. See Mucci v. Houghton, 89 Iowa 608, 57 N.W. 305 (1894); Lath rope v. Flood, 6 Cal. 
Unrep. 637,63 P 1007 (1901), rev'd on other grounds, !35 Cal. 458,67 P 683 (1902); Ricks v. Budge, 
91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937); Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wash.2d 257, 130 P.2d 341 (1942). 
209. See Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 116 Cal. App.2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (1953); 
Le Juene Road Hosp. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Anno!., 35 A.L.R. 3d 
841 (1971). 
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plaintiJI's favor. For example, courts increasingly are willing to allow 
juries to find malpractice where a hospital refuses to admit a patient in 
an emergency; 210 as a result, the defense that the patient had not been 
admitted to the hospital-which in some earlier cases insulated hospi-
tals from liability for failure to treat211 -may be unavailable. 212 Simi-
larly, the courts have eroded earlier holdings that private hospitals-as 
opposed to public institutions-have no duty to provide lifesaving 
treatment. 213 In addition, the failure of physicians to obtain informed 
consent from patients is becoming an increasingly successful cause of 
action214 that could be asserted against doctors who withheld from 
their patients adequate knowledge of the existence of a lifesaving treat-
ment in order to facilitate rationing. Finally, the media recently have 
210. See Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hasp., 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975); Wilming-
ton Gen. Hasp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961); Hunt v. Palm Springs Gen. Hasp., 
352 So.2d 582 (Fla. App. 1977); Barcia v. Society of N.Y. Hasp., 39 Misc.2d 526,241 N.Y.S.2d 
373 ( 1963); Mercy Medical Center v. Winnebago County, 58 Wis. 2d 260, 206 N~W.2d 198 (I 973). 
Some states have enacted legislation requiring the provision of emergency care. See supra note 71. 
21 I. See, e.g., Campbell v. Mincey, 413 F. Supp. 16 (1975), ajfdmem., 542 F.2d 573 (5th 
Cir. 1976); Cf Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., I 16 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (1953); 
Le Juene Road Hasp. v. Watson, I 7 I So.2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Fabian v. Matzko, 236 
Pa. Super. 267, 344A.2d 569 (1975). 
212. It is unclear whether an ELTwould be deemed emergency care in all cases such that 
a court would recognize a statutory or common law duty to provide treatment under that princi-
ple. The meaning of the term "emergency care" is not spelled out in state emergency care statutes, 
and it is not entirely clear from the case law. The most extensive case discussion, in Wilmington 
Gen. Hasp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135, 139 (1961 ), defines an emergency as a situation 
"obviously demanding immediate attention," but notes that the fact that a patient dies as a result 
of failing to receive emergency treatment is merely hindsight and is not dispositive. !d. at 140. 
Another court has defined an "emergency condition" as one in which a person is in "imminent 
physical danger." Payton v. Weaver, 131 Cal. App. 3d 38,45-46, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225,229 (1982). 
Some situations in which EL Ts may be needed, such as an accident in which certain steps 
must be taken to stabilize the victim, definitely are emergencies under these definitions. In other 
cases, such as with certain patients who have end-stage renal disease, death-though inevitable 
without dialysis or a transplant-might not occur until weeks or even months have passed. For 
this reason, one court has held that chronic kidney dialysis is not "emergency treatment" under a 
state emergency care statute. See Payton v. Weaver, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 46; 182 Cal. Rptr. at 230. 
Interestingly, the court read into the California emergency care statute a requirement that death be 
imminent; the statute merely stated that medical treatment must be provided "for any condition in 
which the person is in danger of loss of life, or serious injury or illness." Payton, 131 Cal. App. 3d 
at 46 n.2; 182 Cal. Rptr. at 229, n.2. 
213. See supra cases cited note 210. 
214. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 
F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 502 P.2d I, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); 
Logan v. Greenwich Hasp. Ass'n, 191 Conn. 282, 465 A.2d 294 (1983); Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 437 
So. 2d 859 (La. 1983); Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 367 A.2d 525 (1977); Hughson v. St. 
Francis Hasp. of Port Jervis, 92 A.D.2d 131,459 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1983); Holland v. Sisters of St. 
Joseph of Peace, 270 Or. 129, 522 P.2d 208 (1974); Peterson v. Shields, 653 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1983). 
See generally Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 IJ. 
PA. L. REv. 340 (1974); Katz, Informed Consem-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 
137 (1977). 
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focused on rationing as an intense, newsworthy topic, and are likely to 
publicize any widespread limitations on treatment. 215 This media at-
tention probably will alert and unite rationing victims, thereby facilitat-
ing concerted legal action. 
In short, if EL T rationing became widespread in the future, it is 
reasonable to expect that at least some legal challenges would be made. 
The nature of these lawsuits would depend on how the rationing system 
was established. An explicit rationing scheme adopted by legislative ac-
tion or by an administrative agency probably would be subject to con-
stitutional challenge. While an equal protection challenge would almost 
certainly be unsuccessful unless the rationing program discriminated on 
the basis of a suspect classification, 216 a rationing plan that did not 
afford patients rudimentary procedural safeguards might be vulnerable 
on due process grounds. 217 A rationing program adopted by an admin-
istrative agency without legislative authorization might also be vulnera-
ble on the ground that it violated the agency's enabling legislation or 
the Administrative Procedure Act. 218 If the Department of Health and 
Human Services established an ELT rationing program under Medi-
care, for example, a court might invalidate the program on the ground 
that it was inconsistent with Medicare's congressional mandate to pro-
vide "reasonable and necessary" health care to eligible patients. 219 
Due to the visibility and political unpopularity of an explicit gov-
ernment ELT rationing scheme, however, ELT rationing is bound to be 
implemented, if at all, less overtly. The most likely scenario is that ra-
tioning will take place on an ad hoc basis or pursuant to internal, non-
public guidelines as health care providers accommodate public cost 
control pressures. 220 This suggests that legal challenges to rationing 
215. See, e.g., Blue Cross/Blue Shield to Curb X-Rays, Scans, supra note 9; Organ Trans-
plants Turn Into Form of Patronage, Wash. Post, April23, 1984, at 1, col. 2; Transplants Increase, 
And So Do Disputes Over Who Pays Bills, Wall St. J., Aprill2, 1984, at 1, col. 6; Survey Says I inS 
Americans Has Trouble Getting Medical Care, Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 1983, at A3, col. 1; Panel Cites 
Need for More Organ Donations, Wash. Post, June 10, 1983, at AI, col. 4; Federal Liver-Transplant 
Policy Said to Cause Children's Deaths, Wash. Post, April 28, 1983, at A27, col. I. 
216. See supra note 110. 
217. See supra note 177. 
218. See supra note 175. 
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(J) (1982). See supra note 67. While the term "reasonable" 
might be read to permit rationing on the basis that it would be unreasonable to furnish expensive 
EL Ts to ali Medicare-eligible patients in need, this would run counter to court decisions that what 
constitutes "reasonable" care is primarily up to the attending physician. See supra note I 23. 
220. Recently, for example, Congress revised the Medicare reimbursement system to im-
pose prospective limits on the amounts the federal government will pay health care providers for 
treating Medicare patients. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 601-07, 
97 Stat. 149, 150-72 (1983). Previously, Medicare employed a retrospective cost-based reimburse-
ment system which permitted health care providers to recover essentially whatever they spent in 
treating Medicare patients. The new system reimburses health care providers at a flat rate depend-
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would take one of four forms: 1) tort actions; 2) injunctions; 3) criminal 
prosecutions; and 4) declaratory judgments. 
A. Torts 
In one type oflegal challenge to rationing, the survivors or next-of-
kin of a patient who died as a result of EL T rationing might sue the 
health care provider in tort. In view of recent trends in malpractice 
law/21 a judge or jury might well find that a failure by either a private 
or public institution to provide an ELT, resulting in the death of the 
patient, constituted an intentional tort (such as abandonment); 222 neg-
ligence (failure to exercise due care); 223 or tortious failure to obtain the 
ing on the patient's diagnosis, regardless of the treatment the patient receives. Health care provid-
ers thus have an incentive to reduce the treatment they provide each patient, since they can pocket 
any dilference between what they are reimbursed and what they actually spend. In short, the new 
system encourages cost-savings, including savings achieved by rationing EL Ts and other re-
sources. For a description of the new payment system and a comparison with the old cost-based 
approach, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, DIAGNOSIS 
RELATED GROUPS (DRGs) AND THE MEDICARE PROGRAM: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAL TECHNOL-
OGY (1983) [hereinafter cited as OTA: DRGs]; lnglehart, Medicare Begins Prospeclive Paymen/ of 
Hospilals, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. I 428 (I 983 ). See also Editorial, Diagnosis-Related Groups. Sel•er-
ity of I// ness. and Equitable Reimbursement Under Medicare, 25 I J. A.M.A. 645 (I 984); Medicare's 
New Limits on Hospital Payments Force Wide Cost Cuts, Wall St. J., May 2, 1984, at I, col. I; U.S. 
Issues New Rate Rules Designed to S01•e Money on Medicare, Wash. Post, Sept. I, I 983, at A3, col. 
6. 
221. See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text. 
222. Under the doctrine of abandonment, a doctor or hospital may be liable if a patient is 
detrimentally alfected by being refused treatment or by being discharged prematurely. See Hall v. 
Nagel, 139 Ohio St. 265,39 N.E.2d 612 (1942); Spendlove v. Georges, 4 Utah 2d 392,295 P.2d 336 
(1956); Annot., 57 A.L.R. 2d 432 (1958). Abandonment might seem an attractive legal theory to 
plaintilfs since the courts reject the defense that refusal to treat is justified by the patient's inability 
to pay. See Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E.2d 367 (1941) (hospital 
liable for injuries to plaintilf after discharging him prematurely due to inability to pay); Becker v. 
Janinski, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 45, 15 N.Y.S. 675 (1891) (jury instructed that physician owes indigent 
patient same degree of care required in case of rich patient); Ricks v. Budge, 9 I Utah 307, 64 P.2d 
208 (1937) (physician refused to continue treatment when patient was unable to pay old bills). The 
courts likewise may refuse to allow the defendant to assert the costliness of an EL T as a justifica-
tion for failing to provide lifesaving treatment. 
223. The standard of care generally applicable to doctors and hospitals is to exercise that 
degree of care customarily exercised by members of their profession or by other, similar institu-
tions. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS I 62-64 (4th ed. I 97 I). This suggests that 
an attack on rationing based on negligence would be confined to the denial of EL Ts that customar-
ily were furnished patients. See, e.g., Hall v. Ferry, 235 F. Supp. 821, 826-27 (E.D. Va. 1964) 
(physician must adopt "those techniques which have become standard in his line of practice"). 
Newly introduced ELTs might not be deemed to be customarily provided, and therefore their 
denial would not be culpable. See infra notes 266-72 and accompanying text. A negligence stan-
dard based on custom also raises the more general question of whether cost-based rationing of 
EL Ts could be attacked in a negligence action if rationing had become customary, even though it 
would be customary to furnish the treatment but for cost. Cf. Note, supra note l I, at 630 ("when-
ever there is an allocation problem there can be no malpractice problem"). 
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patient's informed consent. 224 
At least one recent malpractice action has been brought success-
fully against a hospital for failure to provide an ELT, Blake v. District 
ofColwnbia. 225 Mrs. Blake, complaining of headaches, was brought to 
the emergency room for D.C. General, the District of Columbia's pub-
lic hospital, and died the following moming. 226 Her husband sued the 
city, claiming that his wife's death resulted from the hospital's failure 
correctly to diagnose her ailment, which it had been unable to do be-
cause it lacked aCT scanner. 227 The case was tried before a jury, which 
rendered a $240,000 verdict for Mr. Blake. 228 
The lack of aCT scanner at D.C. General had resulted from cost-
based rationing imposed by controls on the hospital's capital expendi-
tures. Of the twelve major hospitals in the District of Columbia, only 
D.C. General did not have aCT scanner. 229 The District's Health Plan-
ning and Development Agency had refused to allow the hospital to ob-
tain a scanner in 1980 despite the fact that D.C. General had the busiest 
emergency room in the city. 230 Not surprisingly, the hospital was per-
mitted to lease a CT scanner following the jury verdict. 231 
The standard of care based on customary practice has been rejected by a number of jurisdic-
tions in favor of a standard based on accepted or expected practice. See, e.g., Darling v. Charles-
ton Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 
(1966); Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970).ln view of the anti-rationing ethics of the medi-
cal profession, see supra note 54, cost-based ELT rationing would be more difficult to defend in 
these jurisdictions. 
224. See supra notes 1 78, 214. 
225. No. 2623-80 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 30, 1981). 
226. See Down to Cases, Wall St. J., July 6, 1981, at 12, col. 1 (editorial); $240,000 
Awarded in Hospital Failure to Trar.sfer Patient, Wash. Post, July 2, 1981, at Bl, col. I. 
227. For a description of CT scanners, see supra note 8. 
228. See $240,000 Awarded in Hospital Failure to Transfer Patient, supra note 226, at Bl; 
Down to Cases, supra note 226, at 12. 
229. See $240,000 Awarded in Hospital Failure to Transfer Patient, supra note 226, at B1 
and B9. 
230. D.C. General had 97,000 emergency room visits in 1979. See D.C. General to Receive 
Scanner, City Hall News Times, Oct. 1981; Down to Cases,, supra note 226; $240,000 Awarded in 
Hospital Failure to Transfer Patient, supra note 226, at B9. 
231. D.C. Genera/to Receive Scanner, supra note 230. Interestingly, a hospital spokesman 
commented that the savings generated by the scanner in eliminating the need for many exploratory 
surgical and other diagnostic procedures "will more than pay" for the cost of the machine. !d. 
Of particular interest in Blake was the judge's instruction to the jury that the hospital could 
not be held liable for failing to have aCT scanner, but only for failing to transfer the decedent to a 
hospital that did. See $240,000 Awarded in Hospital Failure to Transfer Patient, supra note 226, 3t 
Bl; Down to Cases, supra note 226; telephone interview with Ron3ld A. Karp, Esquire, Washing-
ton, D.C., attorney for plaintiff (March 29, 1983). The problem with this instruction is that, by 
1981, CT scanning had become standard medical procedure, and the lack of assured access by 
D.C. General patients to CTscanner diagnoses was itself negligent. The flaw in the judge's instruc-
tion would become clear if it were given in a subsequent case in which the patient was so sick that 
she could not be transferred. Under the Blake instructions, the jury could not find for the plaintiff 
in that situation even though the consequences were identical to those in Blake. 
288 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
Despite the Blake decision and the trend of malpractice cases in 
general, various factors militate against malpractice liability becoming 
a major roadblock to rationing. First, as noted earlier, the victims of 
rationing are likely to be relatively poor and uneducated. 232 Their sur-
vivors may be unaware that the decedent's life could have been saved if 
he or she had been given an EL T and, even if they suspected it, they 
might have little access to legal remedies. 
Moreover, malpractice actions complaining ofELT rationing may 
not be favored by the courts. Malpractice litigation generally has been 
criticized for generating excessive costs in the form of punitive damage 
awards, lawyers' fees and high insurance premiums, and it may be ar-
gued that these funds might be better devoted to increasing the supply, 
or reducing the costs, of EL Ts. 233 
Judicial disfavor with malpractice challenges to rationing would be 
reinforced because malpractice actions confront the courts with statisti-
cal rather than identifiable lives. 234 The victims of ELT rationing are 
dead, and suits are brought for the benefit of their survivors. Hence, no 
identifiable lives (in terms of lifesaving potential) are directly at stake. 
While malpractice awards might deter future rationing, from the 
courts' perspective the lives that would be saved are unknown, uniden-
tifiable lives at future risk. Since, as noted earlier, the impulse to save 
such statistical lives is relatively weak compared to the impulse to save 
The jury instructions in Blake were criticized as follows in an editorial in the Wall Street 
Journal: 
Any medical doctor familiar with CAT-scanners and emergency rooms and the fine 
points of head wounds would have been there explaining why it was crazy for the Dis-
trict's busiest emergency room not. in 1980, to have a CAT-scanner. The judge in the case 
ruled the jury couldn't find the hospital at fault because it lacked the equipment, only for 
failing to transfer Mrs. Blake to a hospital that did. 
We don't wish to dispute the judge on the fine points of law. He may be right. But 
in one recent six-month period, eight persons died at D.C. General who might have been 
saved had the hospital a CAT-scanner. It seems to us that the real culprit here is a federal 
government that has forced upon states a system that prevents hospitals from buying the 
sort of equipment the doctors think the hospitals need. This was done supposedly to save 
money. It has cost lives. And now. thanks to Oliver Blake, it might start costing states 
money, which we hope will prove the straw that breaks the back of the whole notion that 
the way to cut medical costs is to second-guess the hardware in hospitals. 
Down to Cases, supra note 222 at 12. 
232. See supra notes 202-05. 
233. For criticisms of the medical malpractice system, see generally M. Redish, LEGISLA-
TIVE RESPONSE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 1-3 (1977); 
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973); Medical Malpractice: The Duke Law Journal Symposium (1977); 
Zuckerman, The Costs of Medical Malpractice, 3 HEALTH AFF. 128-33 (1984). 
234. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text. 
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identifiable lives, 235 the courts may not feel compelled to permit mal-
practice judgments that increase the costs of ELTs. 
B. Injunctions 
An alternative form of action complaining ofEL T rationing would 
be a suit for injunctive relief seeking to compel treatment or to prevent 
it from being withdrawn. As with malpractice actions, the incidence of 
such suits would be limited because the likely victims of rationing lack 
judicial access. 236 Indeed, the disincentives to seek injunctive suits 
would be greater than with malpractice cases, because without the pros-
pect of damage awards, litigation could not be financed by contingent 
fee arrangements. 237 Another drawback to injunctive actions is that 
courts may not have enough time to intervene before the patient dies. 
Finally, an injunction tends to introduce the court into the health care 
delivery process; the court may shun the role of having to continue to 
monitor the patient's case to ensure that its decree is being obeyed. 238 
Nevertheless, injunctive actions have certain attractions. First, 
damages are not assessed, 239 and therefore the process costs are likely 
to be lower than in malpractice cases. Aside from the cost of providing 
theELT, the defendant must merely pay his or her litigation expenses, 
and does not face potentially large compensatory or punitive damages. 
Second, and more significantly, a suit for injunctive relief would 
present the court with an extremely compelling opportunity to save an 
identifiable life. The case would be brought by or on behalf of a patient 
who faced imminent death absent judicial intervention. A failure to 
grant relief would be tantamount to a death sentence. Because judges 
are reluctant to authorize executions of persons convicted of heinous 
235. !d. 
236. See supra notes 202-205. 
237. A solution to this problem would be patient organizations like the National Associa-
tion of Patients on Dialysis or Transplants that could establish litigation funds and monitor pro-
vider practice to identify patients in need of legal protection. 
238. For a general discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of injunctions, see 
Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994 (1965). The courts nevertheless seem 
willing to enjoin termination of life support to teiminally or hopelessly ill patients, suggesting that 
their reluctance to assume a watchdog role can be overcome in compelling circumsl::mces. See, e.g., 
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). 
239. A defendant who violated the terms of an injunction might be liable for a fine, how-
ever. See, e.g., NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 563 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 
(1978); Washington Area Metro Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 53! F.2d 617 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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crirncs, 240 their sympathies are likely to be greater for an innocent vic-
tim of disease whose life can be saved by a stroke of the judge's pen. 
A recent California case, Payton v. Weaver/41 illustrates tllis 
point. Till~ was a suit alleging wrongful failure to provide hemodialysis 
to a 35-year old black female with end-stage renal disease who lived on 
Social Security, was addicted to drugs and had alcohol and other emo-
tional problems. When the hospital terminated the plaintiff's hemodial-
ysis treatments after numerous episodes in which she disrupted physi-
cians, nurses, and other patients, she sought a writ of mandate that her 
treatments be resumed. The trial court refused to issue a permanent 
writ, but ordered the treatments continued pending appeal. The appel-
late court agreed with the trial judge that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
the treatments under California's emergency treatment law, since they 
were '"continuing" rather than ''emergency" treatments, and it was 
"unlikely that the Legislature intended to impose upon whatever health 
care facility such a patient chooses the unqualified obligation to provide 
continuing preventive care for the patient's lifetime." 242 The court 
therefore refused to issue a permanent order that she be treated. 
This refusal, however, did not end the matter for the court. First, 
the court stated that when a private hospital has an ELT, the hospital is 
sufficiently like a ''public service enterprise" and it may not withhold 
the resource "arbitrarily, or without reasonable cause." 243 Even in the 
case of a disruptive patient, the court noted, while no single hospital 
may be bound to provide the ELT, "it may be that there exists a collec-
tive responsibility on the part of the providers of scarce health resources 
in a community, enforceable through equity, to share the burden of 
difficult patients over time, through an appropriately devised contin-
gency plan." 244 Since this argument had not been made below, and the 
factual record was not adequate to permit judgment on this basis as a 
matter of law (questions such as whether the plaintiff had access to 
other hemodialysis facilities being unresolved), the court declined to 
rule for plaintiff on this ground. 245 But the court nevertheless was un-
willing to let the plaintiff die: 
240. Of the 34 capital cases decided on the merits by the courts of appeals between 1976 
and 1983 in which the prisoner appealed from a denial of habeas corpus relief, for example, the 
prisoner prevailed approximately 70% of the time. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3405 (1983) 
(Marshall, J .. dissenting). 
241. 131 Cal. App. 3d 38, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1982). 
242. Pay/on, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 47, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 230. 
243. Pay/on, I 31 Cal. App. 3d at 48, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 230. 
244. Jd. (emphasis omitted) 
245. Pay/On, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 48, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31. 
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"What we have said on this point is analytically sufficient to 
dispose of Brenda's legal arguments, and thus to sustain the 
trial court's ruling, but the circumstances are such that we 
cannot responsibly avoid confronting the more fundamental 
question posed by Brenda's challenge .... : what alternatives 
exist for assuring that Brenda does not die from lack of treat-
ment . ... "246 
The court then discussed the possibility of voluntary or involuntary 
conservatorships and psychiatric hospitalization, and continued the 
trial court's order mandating treatment while these alternatives were 
explored. 24 7 
Significantly, the court did not address whether a patient's inability 
to pay, or the cost of the ELT, would constitute reasonable cause to 
deny treatment. The issue of payment did not arise in Payton, presuma-
bly because dialysis treatments are paid for under Medicare. 248 How-
ever, the court's insistence that the plaintiff should not die for lack of 
treatment, and its willingness to spread the burden of disruptive pa-
tients over all providers, suggests that it would regard the cost as a col-
lective responsibility that should not stand in the way of saving an iden-
tifiable life. 
C. Criminal Prosecutions 
A third legal context in which the rationing issue might arise is in a 
criminal prosecution for homicide brought against the physician or 
hospital administrator deemed responsible for the denial of treat-
ment. 249 The prospect of prosecuting conscientious men of medicine 
may not seem salutary. 250 However, in one recent case, physicians were 
arrested for withdrawing life support from a hopelessly ill patient 
246. Payton, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 48-49, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 231 (emphasis added). 
247. Payton, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 50, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 231. 
248. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
249. A distinction between acts of commission and acts of omission sometimes has been 
drawn in the criminal law, suggesting that only the withdrawal and not the denial of treatment is 
murder. See Note, supra note 11, at 625-28. Numerous authorities have rejected this distinction. 
See, e.g., Albright v. State, 50 Ala. App. 480,280 So. 2d 186 (1973); People v. Burden, 72 Cal. App. 
3d 603, 140 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1977); Biddle v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 14, 141 S.E.2d 710 (1965). If 
the physician or hospital is deemed to have a duty to provide treatment, failure to perform that 
duty by withholding treatment is as culpable as the act of withdrawing treatment. See Burden, 72 
Cal. App. 3d at 616 .. 
250. See In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629,637,405 N.E.2d 115, 121 (1980) ("Little need be said 
about criminal liability [for withdrawing life support at request of family]: there is precious little 
precedent, and what there is suggests that the doctor will be protected if he acts on a good faith 
judgment that is not grievously unreasonable by medical standards"). The hesitation to invoke 
criminal sanctions may be overcome by sufficiently egregious facts-for example, a death at a 
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whose family did not desire treatment to be continued. 251 Criminal 
prosecution would seem more likely when the patient or his family had 
requested treatment, and when there was strong evidence that the pa-
tient would have survived if the ELT had been provided. 
D. Declaratory Judgments 
The fear of criminal liability has induced physicians and hospitals 
to seek judicial imprimatur, in the form of a declaratory judgment, 
before life support is withheld or withdrawn from hopelessly ill patients 
who wish to die. 252 Similar protective actions for declaratory relief 
would be expected in cases of cost-based rationing; there, the courts 
would be asked to determine whether an ELT lawfully could be denied 
to a patient if the patient desired to live. 253 
Declaratory judgment offers several advantages over other causes 
of action in the EL T allocation area. First, the plaintiffs would be physi-
wealthy, for-profit institution of a patient denied an ELT solely because of his inability to pay, 
where the hospital administrator ordered treatment withheld over the objection of physicians. 
251. See Barber v. Superior Court of Cal., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 
(!983). In Barber, the appellate court issued a writ of prohibition dismissing a murder complaint 
issued against two doctors who, at the request of the family, had withdrawn life-support equip-
ment and intra venous nourishment from a patient in an irreversible coma. The court reasoned that 
the defendants could not be found guilty since they had no legal duty to provide treatment where 
the benefit of treatment would be negligible in view of the patient's condition, and where the family 
requested the cessation of care. !d. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017-22. But cf, Application of President & 
Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 n.l8 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ("Whether or not a 
waiver signed by a patient in extremis would protect the hospital from civil liability [for withdraw-
ing life support], it could not be relied on to prevent criminal prosecution"). 
252. See Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 
1009 n.l8 (D.C. Cir. 1964); In re Severns, 425 A.2d !56 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 
629,405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); In re 
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 
N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431,426 N.Y.S.2d 517 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980); In reMora, 107 Misc. 2d 290, 433 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
253. The courts differ on whether they should be consulted routinely before life support is 
withdrawn. Compare In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 50,355 A.2d 647,669 (1976) ("We consider that a 
practice of applying to a court to confirm such decisions would generally be inappropriate, not 
only because that would be a gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profession's field of com-
petence, but because it would be impossibly cumbersome") with In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 639, 
405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (1980) ("When a court is properly presented with the legal question, whether 
treatment may be withheld, it must decide that question and not delegate it to some private person 
or group") and Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759, 370 N.E.2d 417, 
435, 435 ("We do not view the judicial resolution of this most difficult and awesome question-
whether potentially life-prolonging treatment should be withheld from a person incapable of mak-
ing his own decision-as constituting a 'gratuitous encroachment' on the domain of medical ex-
pertise. Rather, such questions of life and death seem to us to require the process of detached but 
passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of govern-
ment was created. Achieving this ideal is our responsibility and that of the lower court, and is not 
to be entrusted to any other group purporting to represent the 'morality and conscience of our 
society,' no matter how highly motivated or impressively constituted"). 
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cians or hospitals, who have far greater access to the courts than ration-
ing victims. The impetus for health care providers to protect themselves 
by seeking a judicial declaration would therefore offset the rationing 
victims' inability to sue, which limits the availability of tort and injunc-
tive relief. Second, process costs would not be any higher for declara-
tory judgment actions than for suits for injunctive relief, and unlike 
injunctions, the court would not need to supervise compliance. In addi-
tion, and in contrast to malpractice actions, many declaratory judg-
ments would involve identifiable lives. 254 As noted above, 255 courts are 
likely to scrutinize closely the denial of treatment to a patient who is 
personally before a court. 256 
IV. GuiDELINEs FOR JumciAL DEcisiON-MAKING 
The preceding sections have described the most likely types of 
cases in which rationing controversies might be presented to the courts 
for review. Of course, the precise legal and factual questions facing the 
courts will vary from case to case and according to the type of action. In 
all cases, however, the courts will be called upon to decide certain key 
issues: 1) whether the medical resource is "lifesaving"; 2) whether the 
resource is denied for cost reasons, or on other grounds that might be 
more defensible; and, 3) if the court finds that the resource is truly life-
saving and that the resource is rationed primarily because of cost, 
whether the denial of the resource on grounds of cost is justified. These 
issues are explored to provide initial guidelines for judicial decision-
making. 
254. While a court might be asked to rule on a hospital rationing program in advance of a 
life-or-death situation with an actual patient, the more likely scenario is for the action to be 
brought to decide the fate of a specific individual. 
255. See supra text accompanying note 240. 
256. It might be argued that the courts are not well-suited to decide rationing cases, and 
should decline to do so where possible. For example, judges might be no less likely than medical 
professionals to prefer plaintiffs with whom they can identify. See supra notes 102-03 and accom-
panying text. The courts themselves have debated this question in the context of euthanasia cases, 
and the majority have concluded that the traditional detachment and truth-seeking ideals of the 
judiciary make it the most appropriate social institution for resolving the difficult questions pre-
sented. In any event, the courts are bound to be presented with rationing cases if rationing be-
comes widespread. See supra notes 201-19 and accompanying text. A likely form of action for such 
cases is emergency litigation in which the patient seeks a court order mandating that treatment be 
provided. See supra notes 236-48 and accompanying text. Under these circumstances, there is no 
way for a court to refuse to 'decide the case; dismissal of the complaint would itself be a decision to 
permit the patient to die. As noted earlier, this would be a difficult decision for the court to mn ke in 
view of the identifiable nature of the patient's life. See supra notes 75-87,240-48 and accompanying 
text. · 
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A. Is the Resource Lifesaving? 
. Up to this point, I have not attempted to define in detail what is 
meant by a "lifesaving" medical resource. The discussion has pro-
ceeded on the assumption that it is a therapeutic medical intervention 
without which the patient will die imminently. But what is meant by 
therapeutic? 
1. A MEDICAL RESOURCE IS NOT THERAPEUTIC UNLESS ITS BENEFITS TO 
THE SPECIFIC PATIENT IN QUESTION OUTWEIGH ITS RISKS TO THAT 
PATIENT 
In order for the court to determine that a medical resource is life-
saving, it must establish via expert medical testimony that the benefit 
derived by the patient from the resource exceeds the risk. In general, the 
greater the benefit, the greater the risk that is acceptable. 257 
The benefit to be expected from a specific resource depends on the 
nature of the resource and on the patient's condition. On the one hand, 
a medical treatment may provide a complete cure. This result is approx-
imated by a successful kidney transplant in a patient with end-stage 
renal disease. 258 In other cases, a resource may be able to keep a patient 
alive indefinitely, but without eliminating the underlying disease or fully 
restoring the patient to health; here the amount of benefit varies accord-
ing to the severity of the remaining impairment. Kidney dialysis does 
not cure end-stage renal disease, for example, but it does permit pa-
tients a substantial degree of life free of the encumbrances of their dis-
ease. 259 On the other hand, a respirator can maintain certain vital func-
257. In Barber v. Superior Court of Cal., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 
(1983), the court expressed this equation as follows: 
A more rational approach [to deciding which life-sustaining treatments must be provided 
and when] involves the determination of whether the proposed treatment is proportion-
ate or disproportionate in terms of the benefits to be gained versus the burdens caused. 
Thus, even if a proposed course of treatment might be extremely painful or intrusive, it 
would still be proportionate treatment if the prognosis was for complete cure or signifi-
cant improvement in the patient's condition. On the other hand, a treatment course 
which is only minimally painful or intrusive may nonetheless be considered dispropor-
tionate to the potential benefits if the prognosis is virtually hopeless for any significant 
improvement in condition. 
Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1020. 
258. The cure is incomplete in that the patient may have to take immunosuppressant 
drugs for the rest of his life. See Terasaki, Improving Success Rates of Kidney Transplantation, 250 
J. A.M.A. 1065, 1068 (1983). 
259. See Hearings on National Health Insurance, supra note 40, at 1538 (testimony ofShep 
Glazier) ("Kidney disease is unique because unlike other terminal diseases, for all practical pur-
poses the hemodialysis patient can live a relatively normal life. As long as we get our treatments, 
we can continue to be productive members of society, pay our taxes, and circulate our money back 
into the economy of the country"). 
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tions, but cannot restore consciousness to an irreversibly comatose 
patient. 260 
Another element of benefit is the likelihood that the treatment will 
succeed. Few if any medical treatments have a one hundred percent 
chance of success. The greater the chance of success, the greater the 
benefit of the treatment. 
It should be noted that the relevant benefit is medical benefit to the 
patient in question. In order to prevent the sanctioning of social worth 
rationing, 261 the benefit that might accrue to the patient's family or to 
society in general from providing the resource to the patient should not 
be considered as part of the court's analysis. 
On the other side of the risk/benefit equation is the amount of risk 
that the treatment presents. Again, few if any medical treatments are 
completely without risk. The degree of risk depends on how great the 
chance that complications will arise, and how severe they would be. 262 
For example, a medical procedure might be so dangerous that there was 
a 50-50 chance that the patient would die sooner if treated than if not 
treated. Another type of risk that must be taken into account is the 
frequency and severity of side effects. Certain chemotherapeutic agents 
are highly toxic and produce extremely unpleasant reactions in many 
patients. 263 Treatment with these agents legitimately might be foregone 
for reasons unrelated to their cost. 
Precise assessment of the benefit or risk likely to result from a med-
ical resource is a highly technical skill beyond the expertise of most 
judges and juries. In determining whether the benefits exceed the risks 
in rationing cases, however, the courts can rely on the opinions of medi-
cal experts without having to perform the risk/benefit analyses 
themselves. 264 
260. See in re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 24, 25, 355 A.2d 647, 654-55 (1976); DECIDING TO 
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 43, at 174-81. 
261. See Barber v. Superior Court of Cal., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. 
484, 491 ( 1983) (". . . proportionate treatment is that which, in the view of the patient, has at least 
a reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient, which benefits outweigh the burdens at-
tendant to the treatment") (emphasis added). For a discussion of rationing on the basis of social 
worth, see supra notes 88-110 and accompanying text. 
262. See Barber v. Superior Court of Cal., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. 
484, 491 ( 1983). 
263. The side effects from one of the most powerful anticancer drugs, cisplatin, include 
marked nausea and vomiting, cumulative renal toxicity, loss of hearing, and severe allergic-type 
(anaphylactic) reactions. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 754-55 (J. Angel 38th ed. 1984). See Super-
intendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 732, 370 N.E.2d 417, 421 (in permitting 
chemotherapy to be withheld from institutionalized cancer victim, court notes that "toxic side 
effects of chemotherapy include pain and discomfort, depressed bone marrow, pronounced ane-
mia, increased chance of infection, possible bladder irritation, and possible loss of hair"). 
264. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court of State of Cal., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1008, 195 
Cal. Rptr. 484, 492 (1983) (describing expert testimony); In re Spring, 373 Mass. 728, 732, 
296 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
2. A MEDICAL RESOURCE IS LIFESAVING ONLY IF ITS THERAPEUTIC VALUE 
IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED BY THE MEDICAL PROFESSION 
A second major characteristic of a lifesaving resource for the pur-
poses of judicial decisionmaking in rationing cases is that the therapeu-
tic value of the resource generally must be accepted by the medical pro-
fession. This criterion is analogous to the standard governing 
malpractice cases generally: malpractice is the failure to provide that 
degree of care generally provided by or expected from the medical pro-
fession. 265 There are several reasons for this consensus-type require-
ment in rationing cases. First, as in malpractice, before a court imposes 
a sanctioned, legal duty on a health care provider to furnish an ELT, 
the court should be satisfied that it is not merely imposing the beliefs 
and practices of a minority of the medical profession on the major-
ity.266 Second, the courts must consider the process whereby medical 
discoveries are diffused. Even after the therapeutic value of a new re-
source is demonstrated, its value may not be known to practitioners.267 
It will ill-suit the courts in the context of rationing cases to assume the 
role of educating the medical profession on the latest developments in 
their field. Third, it is necessary to permit the risks and benefits of a new 
resource to be fully evaluated. An adverse effect, for example, often will 
be revealed only after a prolonged period of use. 268 A judicial determi-
405 N.E.2d I 15, I 18 (I 980) (same); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 
421 (same); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 28, 355 A.2d 647, 653-57 (1976). Where there is conflicting 
testimony on the risk/benefit outcome, the courts can adopt the more persuasive or better reasoned 
viewpoint. 
265. See supra note 223. 
266. Cf Floyd v. Michie, I I S.W.2d 657, 659 (Ct. App. Tex. 1928) ("The law recognizes 
that there are different schools of medicine, but it does not favor one recognized school to the 
exclusion of the others"). 
267. The safety and effectiveness of a novel drug must be established to the satisfaction of 
the Food and Drug Administration before it may lawfully be marketed. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 355 
(1977). At the point at which the FDA issues its marketing approval, the therapeutic value of the 
drug will have been demonstrated by scientific studies, but the drug may be relatively unknown 
within the medical profession. Considerable promotional and educational activities are often re-
quired to acquaint professionals with the drug; by law, these efforts may only begin after the drug 
is approved for marketing. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.l(a)(IO) (1984) which prohibits the dissemination 
of any representations that an experimental drug is safe or effective for the purposes for which it is 
being studied. 
268. The injectable drug chymopapain was approved by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion in 1982 as an alternative to surgery in treating herniated lower back ("slipped") discs. Health 
and Human Services News Release, Nov. II, 1982. At the time of approval, the only known seri-
ous risk from the drug was a severe allergic reaction in about I% of the patients injected. !d. In 
June, 1984, however, the manufacturer disclosed that there had been twenty-eight cases of paraly-
sis and other severe neurological reactions apparently resulting from the treatment. See Drug for 
Slipped Disks is Linked 10 5 Deaths, 28 Serious Disorders, Wall St. J., June 7, 1984, at 7, col. 3. The 
risk of these neurological problems did not become evident until approximately 72,000 patients 
had received the injection following approval of the drug. !d. 
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nation that a resource is lifesaving is bound to accelerate its use; this 
should not happen until its risks and benefits are properly appreciated. 
Finally, the requirement of acceptance of a medical resource frankly is 
intended to be a cost-based limitation on the scope of the courts' con-
trol over rationing. Medical experts undoubtedly can envision ex-
tremely elaborate and costly methods for saving lives. To take but one 
example, it hardly can be doubted that the presence of a fully-staffed, 
completely-equipped intensive care unit in every home would cut down 
significantly on deaths from household accidents and domestic quar-
rels; yet a court could hardly find that a family practitioner's failure to 
provide such a facility to his patients was culpable. 
Inevitably, certain potentially lifesaving medical resources do not 
become widely accepted because of their cost. For example, manufac-
turers of proprietary treatments such as drugs and medical devices 
abandon fledgling products upon concluding that, if they were mar-
keted, they would not produce an adequate investment return. 269 Even 
though the effectiveness of expensive medical procedures such as liver 
transplants has been established, they continue to be regarded as exper-
imental, and therefore are not covered under third-party payment 
plans. This is the case, it is charged, because the Health Care Finance 
Administration and private medical insurance companies do not want 
to pay for them. 270 Given sufficient public outcry, specific cases of im-
- plicit rationing can be outlawed by the legislature; this is happening 
with liver transplants271 and with certain commercially unattractive 
drugs. 272 
The refusal of the courts to impose a duty on health care providers 
to furnish resources that are not used widely because of their cost will 
admittedly permit some-perhaps a great deal-of wealth-based ra-
tioning, since the rich will purchase treatments that others are not able 
to afford. Given the limitations on the role of the judicial function in 
this society, however, the remedies for this type of rationing, if any, lie 
with the legislatures rather than with the courts. 
269. It is expected that this would become more frequent as health care cost controls such 
as Medicare's DRG system take effect. See supra note 220. Congress has enacted legislation, 
known as the Orphan Drug Act, to subsidize manufacturers of drugs that are commercially unat-
tractive but that are needed by a segment of the population. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 
97-414,96 Stat. 2049 (1983). 
270. See supra note 23. 
271. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
272. See supra note 269. 
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B. Is the Denial of the Lifesaving Resource Based on Cost? 
After the court determines that a medical resource is "lifesaving", 
it must decide whether the refusal to provide the resource is the result of 
cost or of other factors. As discussed earlier, medical resources some-
times cannot be provided to all in need because of scarcity largely unre-
lated to their cost. 2 73 While the allocation of these resources entails 
difficult ethical and equitable decisions, the courts cannot as a practical 
matter order that unavailable resources be provided to every patient 
with a legitimate medical need. Similarly, in some cases, a resource may 
be withheld from a patient because it is believed that the benefits do not 
sufficiently outweigh the risks. For instance, a patient may decide to 
forego extremely painful treatments if the degree and likelihood of suc-
cess is small. 
In order to determine if the denial of the lifesaving resource is 
based on cost, the court should determine whether, under generally ac-
cepted medical practice, the resource would be provided to the patient 
but for its cost. If so, then the withholding of the resource is cost-based 
rationing. One appealing characteristic of this test is that it obviates the 
need for the plaintiff to produce evidence of the health care provider's 
intent in denying the resource, an evidentiary burden that could prove 
impossible. Instead, the plaintiffs can rely on expert testimony to estab-
lish that the treatment would be called for under generally accepted 
medical practice. The health care provider, of course, could produce 
rebuttal evidence that cost was not the actual basis for denying 
treatment. 
C. Is the Denial of the Resource on Grounds of Cost Justified? 
The final inquiry for the courts is whether the case presents circum-
stances that justify the denial of an ELTon the basis of its cost. Several 
possibilities can be suggested. 
1. AN EL T CAN BE DENIED ON GROUNDS OF COST IF A CHEAPER 
ALTERNATIVE CAN BE PROVIDED THAT IS THERAPEUTICALLY EQUIVALENT 
This guideline is designed to cover situations in which the patient 
desires a particular lifesaving resource but a cheaper lifesaving alterna-
tive is available. The alternative would have to present approximately 
the same risk/benefit ratio as the EL T. In these circumstances, the 
health care provider would be justified in substituting the cheaper alter-
273. See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text. 
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native despite the patient's wishes, and a court should not impose a 
duty to supply the more expensive treatment. 274 
2. AN ELT CAN BE DENIED ON GROUNDS OF COST TO A PATIENT 
IN THE FINAL STAGES OF A TERMINAL ILLNESS IF THE EL T 
WILL NOT INCREASE THE PATIENT'S LIFESPAN AND 
IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE PATIENT'S COMFORT 
In certain cases, a patient may be in the final stages of an irreversi-
ble disease and suffer a severe setback or be stricken with an additional 
life-threatening condition. 275 Even if a treatment is available that 
would reverse the setback or remedy the new problem, a court should 
not order that it be provided (even if it is withheld on grounds of cost) 
as long as it would not increase the patient's lifespan. In this case, even 
though the benefits of treatment might outweigh the risks, the benefits 
274. At present, the techniques of cost/effectiveness analysis are primitive. Serious limita-
tions include the lack of cost and effectiveness data on medical resources, and the absence of any 
coordinated technology assessment capability. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES, STRATEGIES FOR MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS 91-102 (1982). ln 
1978, Congress authorized the establishment of the National Center for Health Care Technology 
Assessment within the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), but withdrew funding 
in 1981 following industry criticism that the activities of the center-particularly the identification 
of technologies in need of assessment-curtailed innovation. See Perry, The Brief Life of the Na-
lional Cemerfor Heallh Care Technology, 307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1095 (1982). Since then, only 
limited assessment activities have been carried out by DHHS, which largely delegated the task to 
the small Office of Health Technology Assessment in the National Center for Health Services 
Research (which in 1983, had only four professionals). See Iglehart, Another Chance for Technol-
ogy Assessmenl, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 509, 510 (1983). 
Critics of legal remedies for rationing may raise the current limitations on technology as-
sessment as an objection to judicial interference in health care allocation, arguing that the courts 
will lack adequate cost/effectiveness data on which to base their decisions. Yet, newly implemented 
cost containment programs such as prospective payment plans, whereby providers are reimbursed 
a preset amount per illness regardless of the treatments actually provided the patient, already 
require that cost/effectiveness determinations be made by physicians and hospitals. See Iglehart, 
supra, at 512. In response, a number of private organizations, including the American Medical 
Association, are engaging in their own technology assessment projects. See, e.g., Editorial, The 
American Medical Association's Diagnostic and Therapeutic Assessment Program, 250 J. A.M.A. 
387 (1983). In addition, Congress is reconsidering the establishment of a major federal assessment 
office. See 8.2504, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Judicial oversight of rationing merely underscores 
the existing incentives to improve cost/effectiveness analytical techniques. 
275. A terminal disease can be defined as one "in which, on the basis of the best available 
diagnostic criteria and in light of available therapies, a reasonable estimation can be made pro-
spectively and with a high probability that a person will die within a relatively short time." Bayer, 
Callahan, Fletcher, Hodgson, Jennings, Monsees, Sieverts & Veatch, The Care of the Terminally 
Ill: Mora lily and Economics, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1490, 1491 (1983). See also FOREGOING LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 43, at 26 (defining terminal patient as one "whose illness is 
likely to cause death within what is to that person a very short time"). 
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would be negligible. 2 76 An exception would be when the ELT is re-
quired for the patient's comfort during the remaining period of his ill-
ness.277 In that case, the court may order that the ELT be provided. 
3. AN EL T CAN BE DENIED ON GROUNDS OF COST TO A PATIENT WHOSE 
QUALITY OF LIFE IS BELOW THAT OF MINIMAL COGNITIVE ABILITY 
A patient who is irreversibly comatose or in a persistent vegetative 
state278 may be denied an ELTon grounds of cost. In these cases, the 
patient has no hope of recovering any significant cognitive functions, 
and the quality of his life can be presumed to be so minimal that no 
appreciable benefit would result from expensive lifesaving efforts. 
276. "A physician has no duty to continue treatment, once it has proved to be ineffec-
tive." Barber v. Superior Court of Cal., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 
(1983). 
277. See Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig 
& Van Eys, The Physicians Responsibility Toward Hopelessly /II Patients, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
955, 958-59 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Wanzer]. 
278. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 51, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (1976) ("the focal point of 
decision should be the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of return to cognitive and sapient 
life, as distinguished from the forced continuance of that biological vegetative existence ... ").A 
patient in a persistent vegetative state is not completely "brain dead," as the court in Quinlan, 
quoting an expert medical witness, noted: 
We have an internal vegetative regulation which controls body temperature which con-
trols breathing, which controls to a considerable degree blood pressure, which controls 
to some degree heart rate, which controls chewing, swallowing and which controls sleep-
ing and waking. We have a more highly developed brain which is uniquely human which 
controls our relation to the outside world, our capacity to taJk, to see, to feel, to sing, to 
think. Brain death necessarily must mean the death of both of these functions of the 
brain, vegetative and the sapient. Therefore, the presence of any function which is regu-
lated or governed or controlled by the deeper parts of the brain which in laymen's terms 
might be considered purely vegetative would mean that the brain is not biologically dead. 
!d. 70 N.J. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654-55. 
In a landmark article providing guidelines for physicians on when to withhold treatment 
from hopelessly ill patients, a group of medical experts has advised that brain dead patients and 
those in a persistent vegetative state can be denied all treatment. Wanzer, supra note 277, at 958. In 
connection with the latter type of patient, the authors state: 
In this state the neocortex is largely and irreversibly destroyed, although some brain-
stem functions persist. When this neurologic condition has been established with a high 
degree of medical certainty and has been carefully documented, it is morally justifiable to 
withhold antibiotics and artificial nutrition and hydration, as well as other forms of life-
sustaining treatment, allowing the patient to die. 
!d. The authors imply that treatment may be withheld at the request of a competent, hopelessly ill 
patient. /d. They are silent on whether or not treatment may be withheld on the grounds of cost 
from a competent, hopelessly ill patient who desires the treatment. They also suggest that all care, 
except for that necessary for the patient's comfort, may be withheld from "severely and irreversi-
bly demented patients" and "elderly patients with permanent mild impairment of competence," 
but are not clear on the extent to which the wishes of the patient or his family should govern. See 
id. at 958-59. This author believes that, in these two categories, lifesaving care should not be denied 
only on the grounds of cost if the patient or his family desire the treatment. 
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In the foregoing three situations, the costs of not providing ELTs 
would appear to be small. Beyond these three exceptions, cost-based 
rationing would encounter the serious objections described earlier in 
Section II, and the costs would seem to be prohibitively high. Accord-
ingly, if the defendant cannot persuade the court that the patient's case 
falls into one of these three categories, the court should order the provi-
sion of lifesaving treatment or hold the proper defendants liable for 
failing to fumish this care. 279 
V. CoNcLUSION 
The notion that the health care system has a legal duty to provide 
EL Ts in certain circumstances despite their cost will strike some as an 
unacceptable handicap on medical cost containment. 280 It may also en-
tail modifications in present cost containment programs. 281 If costs are 
279. The question remains: who should pay for ELTs which the courts order to be pro-
vided? It seems unfair to force these costs to be borne entirely by the health care provider who 
happens to be treating the patient. If the patient has health insurance-either under a public (e.g. 
Medicare or Medicaid) or private (e.g. Blue Cross/Blue Shield or commercialj program-it is 
consistent with the objective of cost-spreading that the insurer ordinarily should pay. A problem 
arises when the insurer has contracted with the health care provider to limit payment-for exam-
ple, under the federal DRG system, to limit hospital reimbursement to a fixed amount per patient 
according to diagnosis regardless of the treatment actually provided. See supra note 220. In these 
cases, court-ordered treatment should be reimbursed according to the special provisions in the 
provider-insurer agreement governing excessively costly care. For example, once a cost thresh hold 
is exceeded under the federal DRG system, the federal government will pay 60% of the cost of 
treatment beyond the amount reimbursed under the specific DRG. See Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601(e), 
97 Stat. 157 (1983); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DRG's AND TilE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT 
SYSTEM: A GuiDE FOR PHYSICIANS I 0 ( 1983). In the absence of such excessive cost provisions, or in 
the event the patient is uninsured, the cost of the ELT should still not be the sole responsibility of 
the health care provider, since this would tend to impose a disproportionate burden on those 
providers, such as public and teaching hospitals, that have relatively large indigent patient popula-
tions. See Davis & Rowland, Uninsured and Underserved: Inequilies in Health Care in the U.S., in 3 
SECURING AccESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note I, at 74. A better approach would be to join all 
local health care providers of the same type (e.g. hospitals, ambulatory care facilities, etc.) as 
nominal defendants and to allocate the costs of the ELT among them. This follows the suggestions 
of the court in Peyton v. Weaver, 131 Cal. App. 3d 38, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225,230 (1982), for dealing 
with disruptive patients on a community-wide basis. A variation on this approach is being consid-
ered in Ohio, where a commission on health care costs has recommended to the governor that 
indigent care cost be apportioned among all hospitals. See GOVERNOR's COMMISSION ON OHio 
HEATH CARE CosTs, FINAL REPORT 68-78 (1984). 
280. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 9, at 7-8; Blumstein, supra note 24, at 252; 
Note, supra note 29, at 1328-29. 
281. The new Medicare prospective payment program, discussed supra note 220, contains 
two features that encourage improper EL T rationing. One is the time frame for recalibrating pay-
ment rates. Under the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21,97 Stat. 65 (1983), 
the classifications and weighing factors that determine reimbursement for each specific diagnosis 
need not be adjusted more frequently than every four years. Pub. L. No. 98-21 § 601(e), 97 Stat. 
157 (1983). This has the effect of discouraging the adoption of new "cost-raising" technologies, 
including ELTs. See OTA: DRGs, supra note 220, at 40-41. If such a technology were adopted by a 
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not sufficiently reduced by these current efforts, pressure will increase 
for relaxation of lifesaving constraints on rationing. The two patient 
populations likely to bear the brunt of this pressure are the elderly and 
those who have a low quality of life as a result of their illness. 282 The 
rationing guidelines discussed above would not permit cost-inspired 
withholding of treatment merely because of the age of the patient or, 
except in extreme cases of patients with no cognitive functions, on the 
basis of the quality of the patient's life. The theory of this Article is that 
these and other discriminations would be so fraught with practical, po-
litical, social and ethical obstacles that their costs would exceed their 
economic benefits. 
Yet control of costs is now a dominant theme in American health 
care. Major experiments are being undertaken at state and federal levels 
to introduce cost into the calculus of medical decision-making. To the 
hospital, the hospital would have to absorb the extra cost during the remaindetof the four-year 
calibration period until the reimbursement allocated for the relevant diagnosis related group could 
be increased. The hospital would therefore have a disincentive to adopt the new technology, de-
spite the fact that it would save lives. 
The ostensible basis for the four-year calibration period is to permit hospitals a sufficient 
amount of time in which to reap the rewards of cost savings. If hospitals find a way of saving 
money within a particular diagnosis related group, they continue to be reimbursed at the estab-
lished rate for the rest of the four-year period, and thus can pocket the difference until the next 
recalibration. If the payment rates were readjusted more frequently, however, they could be low-
ered sooner to reflect the cheaper treatment; this would reduce the amount of time during which a 
hospital would receive a cost-savings windfall, thereby reducing the hospital's incentive for lower-
ing costs. In short, the present system creates a conflict between the need to provide adequate 
incentives for cost reduction and the need to insure the rapid adoption of new lifesaving technolo-
gies, even if they add to the costs per case. 
The solution would seem to be to permit upward recalibration of reimbursement rates at 
any time, but to limit downward recalibration to a suitable frequency-say every four years. This 
would enable hospitals to request increases in rates to reflect the cost of new technologies at the 
same time that they continued to have an appropriate incentive to reduce unnecessary costs. 
The second aspect of the DRG system that encourages rationing is that hospitals have a 
disincentive to treat older and poorer patients covered by Medicare and Medicaid; the reimburse-
ment rates for these patients is fixed by law, whereas the hospital can charge other patients higher 
fees. See OTA: DRGs, supra note 220, at 27. This could not only lead to hospital refusals to admit 
Medicare and Medicaid patients, but also to reduced standards of care and greater rationing by 
hospitals that did admit them. The latter can perhaps be prevented by enforcing quality assurance 
standards within health care institutions. See generally Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with 
Quality/Cost Trade-Oifs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6 (1975). The 
only totally effective method for preventing the former, however, is to employ an "all-payer" sys-
tem whereby maximum hospital (and ultimately physician) charges are imposed for all patients. 
Several states have adopted this approach, although it entails considerable administrative expense 
and reduces competition. See generally Gingsburgh & Sloan, Hospital Cost Shifting, 310 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 893 {1984). 
282. The increase in the size of the elderly population is a major factor in the increased 
costs of health care, in view of the direct relationship between increasing age and poorer health. 
See HEALTH, supra note 73, at 67. 
For a system for comparing treatments based on the quality or life permitted, see supra 
note 128. 
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lifesaving imperative has now been added the cost-saving imperative. 
The preceding model for judicial decision-making in the area of ELT 
rationing is one effort to accommodate the conflict between these 
objectives. 
